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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews positivist theories respecting why 
firms issue secured debt and normative theories purporting to justify 
the first priority status that secured debt occupies in bankruptcy 
liquidations. It shows that both sets of theories leave much firm 
behavior and legal regulation unaccounted for. The current 
consensus to the contrary among legal scholars is thus misplaced, 
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In recent years , finance economists have begun to study 
several prac t ices that the law traditionally regula tes . EKamples 
include at tempted eKplanations of the variety of deb t and equi ty 
ins trument s t ha t  firms issue , l the nature of bond covenants , 2 the
func tions that trade cred i t  serves3 and the likely ac tions o f  
credi tors when t he ir deb tor becomes insolvent . 4 Two features o f  this
work are relevant her e .  These studies are illuminating and 
provoca t ive , but only represent the beginning of coherent explana t ions 
of the phenomena at issue . Also , the normative implications of this 
relatively incomplete understand ing have been uneKplored , Lawyers , on 
the o ther hand , assume these financial prac tices to be well 
understood , and consequen tly have erected regula tory structures tha t 
presuppose the truth of wha t now seem prel iminary or questionable 
positivist theories . This paper eKplores a particular financial 
prac tice--the issuance of deb t  secured by personal property--and a 
r egula tory scheme relevant to this pract ice--the set t ing of 
distributional priori ties when an insolvent firm is l iquidated . My 
principal purpose is to illumina te the unresolved problems in this 
field , but I also want to illus trate the relevance o f  modern finance­
-its  achievement s  and unaccomplished tasks--to areas of business law 
that have d eveloped largely independ ently of this disciplin e .  
2 
If an insolvent deb tor's business is liquidated , its  secured 
creditors may take property subj ec t to their l iens before any other 
credi tors are paid ,5 Congress has also crea ted siK classes of 
"priori ty" cred i tors , the most important of which are eKpenses of 
adminis tra tion (firs t priority) , wage and employee bene fit cla ims up 
to l imited amoun ts ( third and fourth priori ty) and taKes ( sixth 
priority) . Each priori ty clas s is paid in full , to the extent 
available assets exist , b efore the next class is paid , 6 Final ly,  
"general" credi tors , those without security interests or priority 
status , receive payment if payment is possible . As this priority list 
suggests , secured credi tors do much bet ter t han general creditors in 
bankruptcy liquidations . 
The princ iple j usti fication for a distrib ution scheme tha t 
seemingly advantages t he sophi stica ted and relat ively affluent , who 
often take security , a t  the expense of the relatively poor and 
unsophis t ica ted , who o f ten do not , is  that the institution of secured 
deb t  is e fficien t . Lawyers commonly make this claim in a s l ightly 
dif ferent form, as serting that the ability of firms to g ive security 
increases the amount of cred i t  available to them, but the impl icit 
premise is  that t he ga ins to f irms and secured credi tors from 
additional credi t  exceed the costs that security may occasionally 
impose on priori ty and general credi tors . 7 , This efficiency 
j ustification has prevailed ; the accepted wi sdom holds that the 
current bankruptcy priori ty list is norma tively desirable. 
This paper reviews the accepted wisdom. Part I briefly 
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discusses t he factual context and the law of personal property 
securi t y .  Par t  I I  explores the efficiency j us tifica tion for the 
Bankruptcy Ac t ' s  favorable trea tment of personal propert y  secured 
deb t .  I t  argues that this j ustification is weak bec ause efficiency 
explanations for why firms is sue such secured deb t  are unconvincing . 
Part III  next considers distributional explanations for the practice 
of firms to sell secured debt . In this par t , i t  is shown that firms 
sometimes have incentives to issue secured deb t to redistribute wealth 
from particular unsecured credi tors to themselves , but that 
distributional explanations for the existence of secured deb t  also are 
ultima tely unsatisfying . Finally , Part IV initially asks what should 
be done if the efficiency j us tification for c urrent law is rej ec ted . 
The mos t  appropria te refo rm that this s tance implies is to eleva te the 
p riority s ta tus in bankruptcy liquidations of creditors thought 
deserving o f  hel p .  Part IV, however , also shows that the normative 
theories relevant to the question which bankruptcy p riority list is 
preferable are suf ficiently primitive as to make ques tionable any such 
case for radically altering present law. 
This essay's principal conclusion therefore is t hat scholars 
and decisionmakers should no longer regard as set tled the question 
which bankruptcy priority lis t  is normatively preferable . Much more 
work mus t be done to make compelling the efficiency defense of curren t 
law, ye t normative j ustifications for al tering this law are also 
poorly developed . 
I .  THE FACTUAL CONTE XT AND THE LAW 
A .  The Factual Context 
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Firms issue d eb t  on sho rt and long term base s .  Sho r t  term 
d eb t  usually is payable within a year while long term deb t  may be 
outstanding for thirty o r  more years . Debt of two kinds i s  issued 
b ecause firms o f ten have cyclical financing needs . If firms issued 
only long term deb t to finance long term and current need s ,  they would 
thus be paying in terest for short term financing in periods when no 
short term financing was necessary . To avoid this waste , firms 
finance long term needs , such as for capital assets or realty , with 
long term deb t and short term need s ,  such as for inventory and raw 
ma terials , with short term or current deb t , 8 
To be used as collateral for long term deb t ,  personal property 
must have suf ficient longevity to make a satis fac tory lien pos sible . 
Much personal property fails to satisfy this requirement . Thus long 
term deb t is c oounonly secured with real esta te and unusually long 
lived industrial capi tal such as railroad rolling stock, 9 Short term 
debt is usually secured wit h  inven tory , accounts receivable , equipment 
wi th a relatively sho rt life and negotiable instruments or instruments 
of credit . 1 0  This paper ' s  concern with security interests in personal 
I 
property thus requires i t  to focus primarily on short term deb t .  The 
security interests that sometimes acc ompany i t  are regulated b y  the 
Uniform Commercial Cod e .  
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B. The Law 
Although secured parties always have come first in bankrup tcy 
liqu ida t ions , the law was tradit ionally believed to have s truck a 
rough balance between the interes ts of sec ured and unsec ured 
cred i tors . This was largely because security , es pecially persona l  
property sec uri ty,  was costly to take , state law having established 
dif ficul t requirements for creat ing and g iv ing public no t ice of 
securi ty interesta . 1 1  In consequence,  it was inconvenient for 
credi tors to lien all of a debtor' s  asset s ; a "cushion of free assets" 
was sometimes available to satisfy a t  least a portion o f  t he claims of 
those credi tors t hought lea s t  able to pro tect themselves--employees , 
tenants ,  small trade creditors . The Uniform Commerc ial Cod e ,  which 
was ado p ted in the middle 1 960s ,  up set this supposed balance . The 
principal obj ec t and chie f success of Article 9 of the Code was 
significan tly to reduce the coats  accompanying the issuance of d eb t  
secured b y  p ersonal property , 1 2  A s  a resul t ,  secured creditors 
allegedly are taking more and broader security interests than 
previo us ly. 13 
Article 9 reduces the costs of bec oming secured primarily by 
relaxing legal requirements for creating liens . An agreement to g ive
a sec ur i ty interest ordinarily must be wri t ten , but the wri ting need 
contain o nly language of grant and a description o f  the colla tera1 . 1 4 
The des cription, moreover , must only "reasonably identify wha t  i s  
described11 , 15 The Code also reduces the c o s t  o f  giving public no t ice 
of t he existence of a security interest . The secured party must file 
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in a public record office a "financing sta temen t " ,  b ut this document 
only has to identify and g ive the addresses of the sec ured party and 
deb tor and again "reasonably" describe the colla tera1 . l6 
Of significance , Ar ticle 9 also reduces the coats  of taking 
security in terests in "af ter-acquired property".  A credi tor who lends 
on the basis of inventory or accounts receivable is lend ing on a 
wast ing asset because the inventory or accounts exist ing when the loan 
was made wil l  soon d isappear . Pre Code law sometimes required a 
secured party to give publ ic not ice of i t s  interes t  in e ach new i tem 
of collateral as the debtor received i t , 1 7 a requiremen t tha t was 
q ui te cos tly with such rapid turnover i tems as inventory and accounts . 
The Cod e ,  however , allows a financing sta tement to be effec tive notice 
o f  a credi tor ' s  interest in colla teral exist ing when the credi t  was
extended and in "after-acquired" collatera1 . l8 Also , the new
Bankruptcy Act , set t ling a dispute that existed under prior law , makes 
security interests in after-acquired property commonly enforceable in 
bankruptcy i f  that property is inventory or accounta , 1 9 Mos t  a f ter­
acquired property securi ty interests are in collateral of this kind . 
In add i t ion,  Art icle 9 makes a f inanc ing sta tement effective for f ive 
years from the date o f  filing . 20 Thus i f  a particular d eb t  is fully 
paid down , the creditor c ommonly can make another loan without g iving 
a sec ond public notice or ob taining a new security agreemen t . 2 1  These 
Code and Bankruptcy Act provisions also rest on t he premise that 
s ec ured deb t increases wel fare , and implement this premise by making 
such debt much less cos tly to buy . Further , because secured credi tors 
come first in b ankruptcy l iquidations , the Code reforms significan tly 
advantage s ecured at the expense of unsecured d eb t . 22 
II. EFFICIENCY EXPLANATIONS OF SHORT TERM SECURED DEBT 
A .  The Problem 
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Firms will issue and credi to rs will buy secured deb t when the 
private gains to t hese parties from doing so exceed the costs . An 
efficiency explanation of secured deb t  must show when this is so and 
alao that t he social gains from securi ty exceed the social costs . The 
convent ional effic iency story is t hat  high risk f i rms prefer issuing 
securi ty because it enables them to borrow , and credi tors also prefer 
it in this c ircumstance because i t  enables them to make loans they 
otherwise would refuse . 23 Security  has these properties because i t
reduces t h e  risks o f  cred i tors in the event o f  default , largely b y  
allowing t he secured party t o  take t h e  property subject to i t s  
sec urity interest and sell i t  t o  reduce or eliminate the deb t , 24 As
we have seen , t he power to seize and sell o f ten survives the debtor's 
bankruptcy.  
Thi s  conven tional story seems unpersuasive if creditors (i)  
can learn o f  and react to  the exis tence of security ; (ii)  can 
calculate risks of default reasonably prec isely ; (iii) are risk 
neutral ; and (iv) have homogeneous expecta t ions respect ing default 
probab ilities . To see why this is  so , it is  helpful to consider more 
precisely just how secured f inancing reduces a creditor's  risks . A 
lender tha t extend s credit  on an unsecured basis looks to the deb to r ' s  
earning capacity for repayment, but also looks t o  the deb tor's assets . 
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When a creditor becomes secured, however, certain (or all) assets of 
the deb tor are set aside to help insure that this c red i tor is paid ; in 
consequence, its chance o f  collec t ing i ts deb t  are much increased . 
But when these asse ts are removed from the general pool, the chance 
that  the deb tor's  unsecured credi tors will collect their  debts 
correspondingly dec reases . If all credi tors are informed, the secured 
credi tor will charge a lower interest ra te b ecause it is  secured while 
the unsecured cred i to rs will charge higher interest rates because the 
pool of assets available to satisfy their claims has shrunk ; 
c onsequently , the deb to r ' s  to tal interest b ill is unaf fec ted by the 
exis tence of securi ty.  S ince the issuance of secured d eb t  is  itself 
costly , however , the deb tor would be worse off wi th security than 
wi thout i t . Firms would never sell secured deb t .  
This unintui t ive c onclusion i s  illuminated b y  a somewhat more 
formal argument .  Suppose the interes t rate tha t  a creditor charges to 
be partly a func tion of the r isk of default . The premium that the 
credi tor exacts  to bear this risk , called X, can be quantified by the
equation : X • p(-P + bA) . In the equation,  p is the p robab ility tha t 
the deb tor will default and -P is the amount of a particular loan that 
will be lost if default occurs . The second term within the 
parenthesis ,  bA, represent s  the value of the assets expected to b e  
available to sa tisfy the c reditor's  claim a t  the t ime o f  default : b 
I 
i s  the rat io of the credi tor's cla im to the then total outs tanding 
deb t  while A i s  the value of the total asse ts then supposed to b e  
available t o  sa tisfy credi tor claims . 25 The equat ion' thus captures
the familiar idea that the r isk of default is  a func tion of i ts 
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probab ili ty (p) times the loss wh ich default causes ; this loss is a 
func tion of the value of the lost loan (-P) offset by the chance that 
assets can be sei zed to sa t isfy the deb t  (bA) . 
Suppose that  a firm wan ts to borrow $200 from two risk neutral 
credi tors (C1 and c2). It has $100 in available as set s and both
cred i tors assume this value to be stable over time . These creditors 
also as sign a one percent probab ility to default (p • . Ol). Creditor
c1 is to lend $110 and Cred i tor c2 $90 . The firm has only two 
opt ions, to borrow unsecured or to secure c1• What port ion o f  its
interest rate will reflec t the risk of default in either case ? If the 
firm borrows unsecured , p • . 0 1 for c1, -P • $ 1 1 0 ;  b • $ 1 10 /$200 • 
. 55 ;  A • $ 100. So X for c1 • . Ol (-$110 + , 55 x $100) • -$. 55.  For c2,
B = $90/$ 200 = .45. Thus X for c2 = (- $90 + .45 + $100) = - $.45. 
And X c 1 + X c 2 • -$1 . 00 :  the possib ility o f  default will cause
cred i tors to increase interest charges to the firm by $1 . 00. 
The firm's o ther option is  to secure c1• If this were done, c1 
would rece ive all assets on default . Then X for c1- . 01 (- $ 1 10 + 
$ 1 00) • - $ . 10 :  taking security reduces the  premium c1 would charge to
insure aga ins t default f rom -$. 5 5  to - $ . 1 0 .  Credi tor c2, however , 
would get no assets on default . In consequence , X for c2 • . 01 (-$90
+ 0) • -$. 90. Again, the premiums that c1 and c2 will charge because
of default sum to $ 1 . 00 .  Thus if the firm secured c1, i ts total
in terest b ill would be una f fec ted ; the in teres t  premium it would pay 
because of the possibility of default would be $ 1 . 00 whether C1 is  
secured or no one is . The firm, however, would no t be indifferent 
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between issuing securi ty and no t issuing i t .  Issuing s ecuri ty is 
itself costly because the par ties would have to negotiate a security 
agreement, give public no t ice and so forth . Call these costs s.  
Then, wi thout security,  the portion o f  the firm's interest charges 
a t trib utable to the risk tha t  i t  might default would be $ 1 .00. With 
securi ty, its  cost would be $ 1 . 00 + s .  Since S represents a cost to
the firm without any offse t t ing gain , the firm would not issue secured 
deb t .  And to generalize , firms would never sell secured deb t but 
would ins tead pay in terest rates that reflect the ir risk ca tegory ; 
high risk firms would pay high interest rates (p is greater so X is  
greater) while low risk firms would pay low interest ra tes . 
This conclusion is the logical consequence of t he assumptions 
made above about credi tor knowledge , ability , risk neutrality and 
homogeneity of expec tations . Because short term secured deb t i s  o ften 
seen, however ,  something must be going on that is  not accounted for in 
the analysis just mad e ,  or the assumptions themselves are too 
restrictive . Sect ions B, C and D of Part II next consider wha t else 
could be going on ; Par t  II E then explores the consequences o f  
relaxing t he assumptions tha t  credi tors are risk neutral , can 
calculate default risks relatively prec isely and have homogeneous 
expecta t ions . 2 6  
B .  Monitoring Cos ts 
Part II A purportedly showed that security increased the costs 
of unsecured credi tors by as much as it r educed the cos t s  of secured 
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creditors; in consequence , firms had no incen t ive to issue tt. The 
monitoring cost explana tion for the existence of secured deb t a ttempts 
to show how securi ty actually can increase the costs of unsecured 
cred itors by less than it reduces the costs of secured cred i tors , even 
if the assumptions made above of credi tor knowledge , ab ility , risk 
neutral ity and homogeneous expec tations hold. 2 7  To see how this 
explana t ion goes , recall that interest ra tes are partially a func tion 
of the risk of defaul t ,  and that this r isk is i tself a func tion of the 
riskiness of the d ebtor's  business. Suppose· tha t  a f irm borrows money 
at an in teres t rate which accurately reflects the risk of i ts 
enterprise. After the loan is made , the firm pursues a higher risk 
proj ec t for which a higher interest rate would have been charged. In 
consequence o f  this swi tch , the firm has retroactively reduced the 
interes t rate i t  faces ; i t  is borrowing at a low r isk rate for a high 
risk proj ect. F irms sometimes would so ac t because with limi ted 
shareholder l iab ility a firm would capture most of the gains if a high 
risk proj ect pays off but bear only par t of the losses if it does not ;  
cred ito rs will bear the rest of these losses. 
Credi tors know that deb tors have incent ives to reduce interest 
rates retroac tively by taking greater risks. To prevent or l imit such 
deb to r misconduct , they can (and do) monitor deb tors--i. e. , wa tch and 
pol ice them. Monito ring , however , is expensive. A securi ty interest 
is  then explicable as a device to reduce credi to r mon i toring cos ts. 
If a c red itor is fully secured , it need only monito r  to ensure that 
the as sets subj ect to its  securi ty interest are not dissipa ted ; it 
need no t moni tor the deb tor's entire business to prevent the deb tor 
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from taking risks not j us tified by the opera tive in terest ra te. 
The moni toring cost explanation for the existence of secured 
deb t ,  as so far described , is  similar to the convent ional r isk 
reduction explanation analyzed above; that is , it shows how security 
reduces t he costs of the secured credi to r  but ignores the impact of 
securi ty on the unsecured cred i tors. As we have seen , moni toring 
costs aside these credi tors apparently experience cost increases from 
sec uri ty that match the c ost reduc tions that security generates. 
Also , although security may r educe the secured party's  moni toring 
cos t s ,  it seems likely to increase the monito ring costs of unsec ured 
credi tors. This is because the exis tence of securi ty raises the 
expected cost of default for unsecured cred itors by reduc ing the 
available asset pool and thus crea tes incent ives for these parties to 
moni tor more extensively. A monitoring cost theory therefore must 
also explain why the secured c redi tor gains more from security than 
the unsecured c reditors lose from i t. 28 
A way to show that security can reduce a f irm' s  net credi t 
cos t s  is to focus on the method s by which a firm can behave in a more 
risky fashion a f ter a loan is made. Sometimes , behaving in a more 
risky fashion requires a firm to exchange assets for other asse ts. As 
an example , a f i rm that wants  to swi tch from making lathes to making 
amphib ious cars will need different machinery. A security in terest in 
the f irm's property would impede such an asset substitution by drying 
up t he marke t for the firm's equipment. This is because the Code 
provides , in §9-306 (2) , that "a securi ty interest continues in 
1 3  
collateral notwiths tand ing sale, exchang e or other disposition thereof 
unless the d isposi tion was autho rized by the secured par ty • • • •"
In consequence , people would be de terred from purchasing equipment 
from misbehaving firms . Since asset substitution is an important 
method of behaving mor e  riskily af ter a loan is made, the exis tence of 
securi ty reduces the risk of a deb tor misbehaving . Most 
significan tly , it reduces this risk no t only for secured par t ies but 
for anyone who extends credit  to the firm. Thus the increase in 
monitoring costs that unsecured credi tors experience as a resul t o f  
secur i ty may b e  less than the d ecrease i n  monitoring costs tha t the 
secured party incurs ; indeed , where as set sub sti tut ion is the 
principal method of behaving more riskily, the ab solute level of 
monito ring by unsecured credi tors could decline. 2 9
This explanation of t h e  existence o f  secured deb t ,  however , is  
unpersuasive when applied to short term financing si tuat ions b ecause 
the kind of monitoring that security is supposedly a sub s t i tute for 
o f ten seems unnecessary in this case. To see why this is  so , suppose
that c red ito rs can observe at relatively low coat the significant 
as set sub s t i tutions by a debtor that materially alter the riskiness of 
its enterprise . A cred i tor can reac t to the possib ility of such 
sub s ti tut ions in two ways : i t  can moni tor its  debtor fairly 
extensively to reduce the l ikel ihood that the debtor will misbehave o r  
i t  can r ely on t h e  sanct ion of l o s t  good will t o  induce t h e  debtor no t 
to misbehave . Respecting this sanc tion, a firm that b ehaves in a 
ma terially mor e  risky fashion a f ter a loan is made has shown i t self to 
be untrus two rthy, and this will impair its ab ility to obtain future 
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loans . Lost good will would seem of part icular concern to a deb tor 
that primarily uses sho rt term financ ing . Such a firm mus t enter the 
credi t market frequently , and is likely to regard the good will cost 
from asset substitut ions as high in relation to the re troac tive 
interes t ra te r educ tion that those substitutions produce on one or a 
few loans . In consequenc e ,  the cred i tors of a firm such as this 
probably would choose to incur the rela t ively low coa t o f  ob serving 
whe ther significant asset substitutions have occured , so as to invoke 
t he good will sanc t ion,  rather than the rela t ively high coat of 
policing to prevent this form of misbehavior .  Security interest s  are 
expensive , however , and thus seem substitu tes only for the high coat 
version of moni toring--that ia , policing for prevention purposes . 
Credi tors have an incentive to engage in this form of polic ing during 
long term financing situations , where the deb tor's good will coats  
from misbehavior ar e r elat ively leas . The monitoring coat explanat ion 
therefore pred.ic ta that firms may issue secured deb t when much o f  
t he ir f inancing is  long term but will seldom d o  so when they primarily 
use short term cred i t . The relatively large amount of short term 
secured deb t  is sued b y  retailers thus constitu tes a serious 
counterexample to the monitoring coat theo ry. 30 
That short term debt sometimes has many o f  t he charac teristics 
of long term deb t is  an insufficient response to this difficul t y .  
Short term deb t  is  considered long term debt for some purposes when a 
deb tor and par t icular c reditor form a r elatively permanent 
as socia t ion . As an example, a bank may f inance a par ticular retailer 
for many years , taking secur i ty interes ts in i ts (everchanging ) 
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inventory and accounts receivable . Banks, however, extend funds on a 
periodic basis in such relationships, and will terminate if the firm 
behave s more riskily.  Moreover, such a creditor can conveniently 
learn of important changes in its deb tors ' businesses . Thus even in 
these "lo ng term" financ ing situa t ions the good will costs of debtor 
misbehavior seem suffic ien tly high to make ques tionab le the moni toring 
cost explana t ion for the exis tence of secured d eb t .  
A second reason wh y  this explanation fails t o  hold i s  tha t  the 
danger of asset substitutions that secured deb t  is supposedly meant to 
prevent varies wi th the leng th of the loan . A short term cred i tor 
thus would commonl y  perceive significant asset substitutions to be 
relatively low probab ility events . Firms, it is  true, sometimes do 
importantly al ter the ir affairs during the course of their lives, but 
such fundamental changes take time to conceive and implement .  A 
credi tor holding a one year note, for example, i s  therefore likely to 
assume tha t i ts deb tor would be in roughly the same l in e  of work at  
year's end . 3 1  Thus aga in short term credi tors would have lit tle 
incent ive to take security as a substitute for incurring high 
monitoring cost s .  
To summarize, the monitoring cost explanation for the 
exis tence of secured debt only holds when unsecured credi tors can 
freeload on the property of security to impede asset substitutions . 
When such freeloading occurs, security reduces the costs of secured 
cred i tors by more than it increases the costs of unsecured cred i tors, 
thereby creat ing an incent ive for firms to issue i t .  Freeloading 
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apparently would no t occur, however, when firms primarily use short 
term financing because short term cred i tors would seldom need to 
moni tor to reduce the odds of sign i ficant asset substitutions . This 
is because the sanc tion of lost good wil l  would often induce debtors 
not to engage in such substitut ions when the ir financing is primarily 
short term and also because short term creditors are likely to 
perceive asset substitutions as rare events during the course of their 
loans . When security does not subs t i tute for moni toring to prevent 
misconduct, i t  neit her reduces the moni toring costs of those who take 
it nor ben ef i ts those otherwise disadvan taged by i t .  The monitoring 
coa t explana t ion t herefore predicts that  firms will seldom issue 
secured deb t when the ir financing is primarily short term and it is 
thus seriously embarras sed by the subs tantial amoun t of secured deb t  
that retailers issue . 
c. S ecured Debt as a S ignal 
A second explanation for the existence of secured debt that 
also is consis tent with the assumpt ions made above about credi tor 
knowledge, ab ility, risk neutral ity and homogeneity of expec tations is  
that f irms is sue security as a "signal" to credi tors of their 
prospec ts . Signaling explanations for the financing dec isions o f  
firms are b ecoming common and seem promising . 3 2  A t  this s tage i n  the 
development o f  signal ing models, however, these explanations are 
unsatis factory b ecause i t  is  difficult to know whether a part icular 
activity is a signal and it is also d ifficult to know whe ther a 
particular s ignaling outcome i s  eff ic ient .  
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To perceive the promise and problems that at tend a s ignaling 
explanation for the issuance of secured deb t ,  first suppose that at a 
given time firms seek to finance a set of proj ects whose outcomes are 
highly variable . Firms know the "quality"--for example ,  the o utcome 
mean and variance--o f the ir own proj ects but credi tors canno t 
dis t inguish among firms on the basis of quality.  This information 
asymme try could occur because the quality of a part icular proj ect is a 
func tion o f  fac ts and prospects that out siders can observe only wi th 
great difficulty ; further , the firm has an incentive to overestimate 
the l ikel ihood of favorable outcomes . In this circumstanc e ,  interest 
ra tes in t he loan market would reflect average proj ect quality . 
Moreover , were the marke t to set interes t s  rates that reflect a 
rela t ively high average quality (higher t han the average risk of 
proj ects) , firms would supply large numbers o f  low quality proj ects . 
Thi s  is because firms wi th low quali ty proj ect s  could borrow a t  rates 
that  reflected r isks below the actual risks the ir proj ec ts faced ; such 
firms would make subs tantial gains at  the expense of credi tors . 
Cred itors , however , are aware of this possibility and , when they lack 
info rma t ion about the quality of particular proj ects , will suppose 
average proj ec t quality to be relatively low. In this even t ,  f irms 
t hat  have proj ects whose quality is  higher than the market average 
could no t get credit  on accurate terms . These firms thus have an 
incent ive to inform credi tors o f--that is , to "signal"--their rela t ive 
status . 
An effec tive signal mus t enable observers of i t  to sort out
t he signalers acco rding to some cri terion that the observers consider 
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relevant . This signaling property probably exis t s  in credi t markets 
i f  the cost o f  s ignaling a firm ' s  r isk status declines as the quality 
of t he firm's proj ect s increases . This is because , if proj ect quality 
were uncorrelated with signaling costs , firms wi th low quality 
proj ects would send out s ignals of high quali ty and credi tors would 
learn to d isregard the signal as an indicia of quali ty. 
A security in terest migh t be such an effective s ignal . 
Securi ty interests rest r ic t  future borrowing opportun i ties , g ive 
s ecured credi tors grea ter leverage over firm behavior and make i t  more 
dif ficult for a firm to reschedule deb ts in the even t o f  hard times . 
Thus a f irm t hat  is willing to encumber i t s  assets i s  "s ignaling" 
tha t ,  in i t s  view, i ts prospec ts are such as to j ustify these 
po tential costs . Further , signaling cost s  apparently vary inversely 
with proj ec t quality because these costs are par tly a function of the 
l ikelihood t hat  the f irm will experience f inancial dif ficulty . A f irm 
likely to earn high profi ts , that is , may worry l i ttle about the 
f uture restric t ions on i t s  ab ility to borrow tha t  a security interest 
may create o r  about the power that a security interes t g ives to a 
credi tor to influence firm decisions if no profit s  are realized . 
Firms that expec t not to do wel l ,  on the o ther hand , may regard the 
expected costs of issuing secured deb t  as high b ecause those costs 
could wel l be incurred . In consequence of the apparent proper ty of 
secured d ebt to communica te accura tely to creditors a firm's  true 
estimate of i ts expected earnings ,  the existence of secured deb t  may 
be explained as a signal ing phenomenon : t he informa t ion tha t  iss uance 
of secured deb t conveys enable firms to borrow on terms tha t more 
1 9  
accura tely reflect their risk classes.  
Thi s  explanation is plaus ible if creditors actually have an 
incentive to use the signal over t ime and f irms have an incentive to 
signal correc tly . To perceive the c ircumstances under which these 
condi t ions may be met , suppose that Z is  an unobservable variable 
reflec ting the projec t  quality of a particular firm . This variable 
has t he property that if f irm one has a higher quality  proj ect than 
firm two , z1 > z2• Le t Y be the signal that firms send for proj ect
quality . Credi tors initially believe , for t he reasons g iven above , 
tha t a higher Y--a security interest tha t encumbers more assets or 
encumbers as sets for longer periods of t ime--correla tes posi t ively 
wi th higher qual i ty .  For example ,  cred i tors ini tially believe that a 
f irm t hat signals Y1 has proj ect quality z1• If such a f irm would
ac tually maximize profi ts by signal ing Y1 when it has quality z1, the
credi tors'  beliefs are confirmed . In this case , the market will reach 
a "signal ing equilibrium" : creditors will use the signal because they 
at tribute informa t ional content to i t  that  the ir experience confirms 
and firms have an incentive to signal correc tly.  
A relatively simple example shows that such a signaling 
equil ibrium might occur . 33 Suppose that two groups of firms exis t ,  
those with low quali ty proj ect s (Group I )  and those with high quali ty 
proj ec ts (Group II ) ,  It costs a firm in Group I $ Y  to gran t a 
part icular securi ty interest and a firm in Group II $ Y/2 to issue the 
same security interes t .  High quality f irms in Group II have lower 
signal ing cos t s  i f ,  as argued above , these costs vary inversely with 
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proj ec t quali ty.  Credi tors in this illustra t ion init ially bel ieve 
tha t  a firm that g ives a security interest tha t costs less than $.!i s  
risky enough t o  require an interest charge o f  $ 10 for its  loan while a 
firm that gran ts a security interest whose cost is greater than or 
equal to $.! is sound enough to j ustify an interes t charge o f  $5 for 
the same loan . Given these creditor b el iefs , Group I f irms will no t 
grant security interest s--will signal Y • 0--if  10 < 5 + .!• Group II 
firms will grant a security interest whose cost equals.! i f  5 +.! /2 < 
1 0. Comb ining these inequali t ies , when $5 < .! < $ 10,  cred i tor beliefs 
about proj ec t quality are confirmed . For example ,  i f  cred itors 
ini t ially associate a low quality proj ect with a security interest--a 
.!.-- of less than $ 7  and a high quality proj ec t with a .!. o f  $ 7  or more , 
they will observe in the market that firms wit h  low quality proj ects 
signal .!. • 0 < $ 7  and firms with high quality proj ects signal Y • $ 7  • 
.!.• a confirming set of signals . 34 
This illustration is too simple because o f  the crudity of 
cred i tor beliefs and because o f  the discre teness o f  the in tervals 
chosen : proj ect r isks supposedly are such tha t interes t charges of $5 
or $ 10 only are justified . Nevertheless ,  equi librium s ignaling 
schedules have b een shown to exist when more sophisticated beliefs are 
a t tributed to credi tors and less "lumpy" variables are assumed , 35 
These schedules have the property that a continuum of prices (here 
interest rates )  exi s t , condit ional upon t he level of t he signal , such 
that when firms ac ting as price takers choose their maximizing signal 
level , credi tors f ind that t he ir quali ty forecasts are confirmed . 
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In Figure 1 ,  the level of the signal--the bread th and length of a 
securi ty interest--is plot ted on the horizontal axis and proj ect 
qua l ity--the firm's prospec ts--on the vertical axis . To show that 
only one signal ing schedule can exist  in equilibrium, first consider a 
sec ond schedule , GG . A f irm wi th quality level Z would signal Y' , as 
would a firm wi th quality level Z*, where � > Z*; thus the signal Y' 
wo uld be use less to cred itors . Put another way ,  the assumption that 
signal ing cost varies inversely with proj ect quali ty is violated by 
the exis tence of the schedule GG, for tha t  schedule permits low 
quality f irms to "mimic" the signals of high quality firms : both s uch 
firms here would signal y•, Now consider the schedule HH. A firm with
quality Z* could signal this to credi tors by taking a security 
interest o f  the value Y' (along FF) or Y" (along HH), but Y' < Y" , 
Firms thus would prefer to be on FF b ecause the same level of quality 
can b e  signaled at lower cost on this schedule than on any schedule to 
the right of FF in Figure 1 .  Thus an equilibrium signal ing schedule 
in a g iven cred i t  marke t must be unique . 
To s ummarize the signaling explanat ion , firms have an 
incentive to issue secured deb t as a way of sorting themselves out by 
risk class if creditors take the exi s tence and level of secured debt 
as an ind ic ia o f  firm profi tability . Cred i tors may hold such beliefs 
because of t he property of secured d ebt that  it is more cos tly for 
firms to issue when the ir proj ects are o f  low q uality . Further , 
pro fi t maximizing f irms have an incent ive to s ignal in such a way as 
to confirm cred i tor beliefs respecting the relationship between the 
exis tence and level of security and the prospects  of f irms . 
Thi s  signal ing explanation is promising but unfortunately has 
serious dif f icul t ies . Ini tially , a securi ty interest s ignal may be 
ambiguous b ecause it requires cred i tors to know the risk preferences 
of f irm owners . 3 6  To see why this is  so , suppose two f irms that have 
identical prospects--z1 • z 2 • The owners o f  firm one are risk
preferers ; t hey are rela t ively unconcerned about grant ing broad 
security interests because they count the marg inal benefi ts from 
potential gains more heavily than the marg inal costs from potential 
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los ses . Firm two ' s  owners , however , are risk averse ; they take qui te 
seriously the costs tha t  a broad secur i ty interest could impose on 
them .  I n  consequence o f  these attitudes toward risk , f irm one could 
issue a broader securi ty interest than firm two--signal )_ > Y2 - ­
although in fact z1 • z2 • The securi ty in terest s ignal would then b e
useless and cred i tors would not rely on i t .  Th e  signal ing cost 
explana t ion for the exi s tence of secured debt thus rests on the 
seemingly s trong assumption tha t owners of firms in any given market 
have roughly similar a t titudes toward risk . 
Fur the r ,  whether a securi ty inte rest signal ing equilibrium 
increases welfare is hard to know. Firms will signal if the ir gains 
from doing so exceed their costs , but it is a separate question 
whet her the social ga ins exceed the social costs . The priva te gain to 
a firm from signaling , supposing credito rs to use securi ty interest 
s ignals , is t he interes t  rate reduction t he signal genera tes . The 
social gain is that the signal helps produce better "ma tches" between 
c redi tors and firms ; the amount and cos t of credi t ,  that is , more 
closely approximate their " true" levels wi th signaling than without 
i t . ·  If a security in terest signal , however , actually tells credi tors 
little  about the riskiness of firm proj ec ts , too much signal ing could 
occur in equilib rium ; t he total costs tha t  f irms incur in sending 
signals will exceed the total social gain generated by more 
app ropria te c redi t extensions . Security interests seem rela tively 
c rude information transmission devices so the chance tha t they 
actually reduce welfare is  nonnegligible . But the impo rtant point is 
tha t it is difficul t to know whe ther too much signal ing will occur in 
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equilibrium. This is because finding out requires a c omparison of the 
accuracy of c red i tor assesments of f irms ' proj ec ts in a no signaling 
wo rld with the as sessments t ha t  are made by use of security interest 
signal s .  At this stage , no theory is  suggestive of t he outcome of 
such a c omparison , in general or in part icular cases , nor have the 
relevant fac ts been ob tained . 
Answering the wel fare question is also d if ficult for ano ther 
reason ; signaling equil ibria o f ten appear unstable and this 
instab ility may make unfeasible even rough comparisons between 
signal ing and no signaling worlds . 3 7 To understand how s ignal ing 
equilibria break up , suppose tha t all proj ects in the market will earn 
posi t ive profits  at the highest intere s t  rates charged . Firms at the 
lower end of t he market d istribution for quali ty--those wi th the 
riskies t proj ec t s--signal !.• Wit h  a rising quali ty d i s tr ibution-­
higher qual i ty f irms grant more ex tensive securi ty interests--the 
lower end f irms actually form an interval , say from 1• the lowest 
qual ity,  to Z, with average qual i ty being z0, All these firms will 
signal r. however , because the costs of signaling a greater y would 
exceed the gains for those firms whose quality level is above but 
qui te close to z. For f irms that signal X,, the market in teres t rate 
is .!l:.• Suppose tha t a given c red i to r  offers an interes t rate justified 
by t he average quality level in the 1•··Z interval to �ny firm tha t 
signals X,; the lender b ids R0 which correlates with z0• This cred itor 
would make no ga ins from firms within the interval because it gets 
jus t  tha t average quality o n  i ts deb tors ' projects that the interest 
ra te justi fies . Bu� because the dis tribut ion of firms by quality does 
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consis ten tly rise , some firms whose quali ty is j ust  above the interval 
� to Z will exist who never theless single Y ;  this is because , for 
t hese firms also , the costs of  signaling the ir true quali ty level--say 
Z1--are too high . These relatively high quality firms will also 
borrow f rom our credi tor because R0 < _!; and t he ir appearance raises 
the average quality of this cred i tor's deb tors . Thus a c red itor who 
b id s  an interes t  ra te sligh tly below the marke t minimum is assured of 
doing better than it would have done if it offered the minimum rate ; 
for t he lower bid genera tes debtors with an average proj ect quality 
greater than the bid actually j usti fies . The signaling equilib rium 
t herefore "unravels from the bot tom" , because credi tors and f i rms have 
an incentive to d epart from it a t  this point . 38 
A signaling equilibrium may also unravel from within . 3 9  
Suppose that a firm wi th quality zi above the market minimum signals 
y i , A creditor who of fers an in teres t rate equal to the average in 
the interval zi , , ,zj where zi < zj will get some firms whose quali ty 
i s  greater than zj for the reasons described above . The credi tor will 
also get f irms whose quality is b elow the ziz.j average , however , for
at t he lower ra te it will pay these r ela t ively low quali t y  firms to 
raise their signals to the level yi , Whe ther the c red ito r has an 
incent ive to break the equilibrium from wi thin therefore depend s  on 
the elope o f  the d istribut ion of quali ty by firms ; if the number o f  
high quali ty f irms is increasing rapidly enough around t he signaling 
point Yi , t he c reditor will at trac t more good firms than bad ones wi th 
its lower b id .  Thus whether in ternal unraveling will occur is  a 
func tion o f  a fac to r  that is hard to charac terize or ob serve , the 
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slope of the dis tribution of proj ect quality by firms . 40 To
summar ize , in consequence of the property of signaling equilibria 
o f ten to be uns table at the lower bound and above , it is difficult to
compare ,  either in theory or by empirical investigation based on 
t heory , a part icular signaling market with its  no signaling 
equivalent .  Ye t without such a comparison, assertions tha t  signaling 
is efficient are esent ially ad hoc . 
These c ri ti c isms of the signaling explanation make two points : 
First , signaling may not account for the exis tence of secured debt 
because a secur i ty interest might be an insufficiently clear signal . 
Second , if firms issue secured deb t  as a signal , the social gains such
s ignaling generates have not  been shown to exceed the soc ial costs ; 
also , s uch a showing seems hard to make b ecause of the difficulty of 
tes t ing signaling hypo theses empirically . Taken together , the 
'crit icisms demons tra te the present unpersuasivenese of a conclusion
that security interests are efficient signals . 
D ,  S tagger ing Debt 
The last serious efficiency explanation for the exis tence of 
secured debt tha t  is consis tent wi th the assumpt ions made above about 
cred itor knowledg e ,  ab ility,  r isk neutrality and homogeneity of 
expectat ions follows from the premise that properly s taggered deb t  can 
increase profi ts . To see how this premise applies here ,  suppose a 
f irm t hat knows i t  will have credi t needs over t ime and also knows 
that the interes t rate reduc t ions of secured deb t will tr igger 
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corresponding interest ra te increases by unsecured credi tors . The 
firm may borrow on a secured basts and later borrow on an unsec ured 
basis . By so do ing , it pays lower interest ra tes early and higher 
interest rates late . If the return earned by investing the difference 
between the secured and the unsecured interest rates exceeds the costs 
of granting secur i ty ,  the firm will issue secured deb t .  Such secured 
d ebt would also be efficient because the f irm benefits while no one 
lose s .  
This staggering deb t explanation generates t wo predic tions 
tha t apparently are inconsis tent with the facts : f irms wi th frequent 
c red it n eeds wil l seldom issue secured deb t ,  and firms tha t  can profit 
from s taggered borrowing w ill issue secured debt as e arly in their 
l ives as possible. Respecting the first pred iction, if a firm ' s  
cred i t  needs a r e  cont inuous , a s  when i t  cons tantly buys goods on 
c red i t , there would be l it tle opportunity to earn a r eturn sufficient 
to just ify issuing security b ecause the f irm would experience h igher 
interest rates from unsecured creditors qui te promptly. Relatively 
smal l retailers seem to have frequent credi t needs , yet such f irms 
sometimes borrow on a secured basis. Respec ting the second 
predict ion , if a f irm can earn posi t ive profits by invest ing the 
interest rate d ifferential between secured and unsecured deb t ,  it has 
an incent ive to issue secured debt f irst and la ter borrow unsecured . 
In this way i t  can capture these pro fits as soon as possible. 
Sys tema t ic pat terns of f irms borrowing accord ing to the pa t tern of 
issuing secured deb t first seem no t to have b een observed. Since the 
s taggering deb t  explanat ion yields predictions that the (very sparse) 
data apparently fall to support , i t s  validity is question able. 
E.  Risk Aversion, Uncertainty and Heterogeneous Expectations 
(1) Risk Aversion 
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Secur i ty interes ts might increase welfare if they helped sh ift 
risks from more to less risk averse credi tors . Whether they play a 
significant role in perfo rming this function is problematic .  To see 
the relevance o f  a r isk aversion explana t ion , recall that the argument 
respec ting why secur i ty would no t reduce a firm's  net cred i t  cos ts 
presupposed tha t all credi tors wer e  risk neutral· In the illus tra t ion 
in Par t  II A, when neither c1 nor c2 were secured , they pr iced the 
default risk a t  i t s  actual value , $ .55 and $ . 45 respec t ively. Suppose 
instead tha t c1 were r isk averse ; to b ear a $ .55 risk it would charge
the debtor $ . 60. Let c2 remain risk neutra l ;  i t  would charge a r is k ' s
ac tual value wha tever the l evel of the risk. Under these new 
assumpt ions , the interest ra te increase a t t r ib utable to the risk of 
default when neither cred itor is secured would be $ 1 . 05. When c1 
became secured , i t s  risk in the illus tra t ion above dropped to $ . 1 0  
wh i l e  c2 ' s  r isk rose t o  $ . 90 . Since r isk aversion generally varies
with the degree of risk , suppose that c1 would only charge $ . 0 1  for
b earing a $ . 10 risk . Then by secur ing the r isk averse c red i tor--e1 -­
and shift ing r isks to the r isk neutral credi tor--e2--, the f irm' s net
c red i t  cost falls by $ . 04 , from $1 . 05 to $ 1 . 0l .  This decl in e  is a net 
welfare ga in since the f i rm  is made bet ter off but no one i s  made 
worse off , And to generali ze ,  securi ty is used to �educe a firm ' s  net 
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credi t costs by shift ing risks from more to lees risk averse 
c red itors . 
The risk aversion explana tion seems plausible,  but has two 
serious dif ficult ies . First , it fails to show why credi tors respond 
to risk aversion by taking security . Because taking securi ty is  
cos tly , risk averse credi tors may prefer to buy low risk debt d irectly 
rathe r than buy high risk deb t  and reduce i ts r is k  by mortgagee . 
Since much low r is k  deb t  exists , the risk aversion explanat ion is 
incomplete . 41 S econd , g iven what is  known about the goals tha t 
corporate managers actually pursue , expla ining t he exi s tence of 
secured deb t as a response to differential levels o f  risk aversion 
among c redi tors seems either mistaken or tau tological . To perceive 
the nature of t hi s  d ifficulty,  recall tha t risk aversion in 
individual s is  expla ined by t he diminishing marginal utili ty of money 
theo ry . '11lis theory provides tha t each additional dollar a person 
r ece ives genera tes lees utility for him t han the addi t ion of earlier 
dollars did because later dollars are used to sa tisfy less urgent 
needs . Because money has diminishing marginal utility , a person 
seeking to maximize hie or her expec ted utility would no t be 
indif ferent between equal pros pects of gain or lose ; the person would 
lose more util ity  if the lose material ized than he or she would gain 
if prospects were successful.  That is , for a natural person the 
expec ted utility of being g iven an equal chance of winning or losing 
the same amount would be lees than the ut ility of not gambling . The 
assumptions tha t ind ividuals maximize expected util i ty and that money 
has diminishing marginal utility thus imply individual risk aversion , 
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no t risk neutrality . 
Many of a firm's  business cred i tors , however , are likely to be 
corporat ions t ha t  ar e opera ted by managers whose scope o f  opera t ion is 
to some ex ten t independent o f  shareholder preferences . The question 
what utility f unct ion these managers maximize is  both con troversial 
and unresolved . Economists and lawyers commonly assume tha t the 
managers try to maximize the marke t value of the corpora t ion ' s  s tock . 
Thie goal impl ies risk neutral ity . If managers are assumed to 
maximize share values , the risk aversion explana t ion thus predicts 
tha t corporate c red i tors will be l ike c2 in the example above ; that
is , being risk neutral they w ill lend unsecured at rela t ively high 
interes t rates so individual risk averse c red itors such as c1 can 
become secured a t  rela t ively low in terest rates . The s ub s tan t ial 
amount of short term secured deb t  held by banks and finance companies 
thus consti t utes a troublesome counterexample to t he r isk aversion 
explanation . Suppose next tha t the assumption tha t corporate managers 
maximize share values is abandoned . No c ompet ing assump t ion of what 
goals corporate managers pursue tha t is widely accepted or easily 
defensible exis t s  to take its p lace . Given this theore t ical and 
empirical vacuum , an argument tha t secur i ty is a response to 
dif ferent ial levels of risk aversion among credi tors b ecomes 
tautological : i t  proves the existence of secur i ty by p resupposing 
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dif ferential levels of risk aversion , and i t  proves the exi s tence o f  
differen tial levels of risk aversion by showing tha t secur i ty exists . 
With t he posi t ivis t  analysis in this s ta te ,  two responses seem 
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sensible . First ,  one can assume tha t corpora te managers maximi ze 
share values . Th i s  response calls the risk aversion explanation 
seriously into ques t ion because the corpora te credi tors tha t  firms 
often have are then supposed to be r isk neutral , yet  they sometimes 
take security . Second , one can treat the question what utility 
func tion c orporate managers a ttempt to maximize as open , which implies 
t hat whether corpora te credi tors are risk averse rema ins to be proved . 
With this question open , however , the r isk aversion explanation for 
the exis tence of securi ty i s  no t compelling . 
( 2 )  Uncertainty 
Security in terests also c ould increase welfare if they reduced 
credi tor uncer ta inty . In this connect ion , t he assumption made in Part 
II A above tha t little uncertainty exists seems unrealistic ; a 
cred i to r  calculat ing the risk of default  must predict t he ra t io of i t s  
deb t to ex isting deb t a t  the time o f  default as well a s  the s i z e  o f  
the then available asset pool , but t hese predictions are dif ficult to 
make prec isely . A secur i ty interest may reduce this uncertainty 
because secured credi tors have only to know whether assets w ill exi st 
to sa tisfy their claims . Thus the lower interest rates that accompany 
secured d eb t  may partly be a func t ion o f  the grea ter certainty that 
sec uri ty generates . Since the existence of secured deb t seems no t to 
increase uncerta inty for a firm' s other credi tors , tha t  frac t ion of 
the secured credi tors'  lower in terest charge attributable to 
uncertainty reduction is a ne t ga in to the firm. Firms , the 
explanation goes , i ssued secured deb t  to capture this gain . 
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This explana t ion , however , generates predictions that the 
facts seem no t to confirm and fa ils to explain why creditors respond 
to uncerta inty by taking securi ty . The pr ed ic t ion dif ficulties are of 
two kinds. First , the uncertain ty explana tion predicts tha t ,  o ther 
th ings equal , firms will issue as much secured deb t  as they can; for 
if security always generates net interest rate reduc tions , firms 
always have an incent ive to capture them. Firms , however , of ten seem 
not to issue as much secured deb t as their asse ts would j ustify .  This 
counterexample cannot be made to disappear by arguing that the costs 
tha t security imposes on firms sometimes exceed the gains in 
uncerta in ty r educt ion flowing from securi ty and sometimes do not . 
Such a response is tautolog ical , in the absence of further evidence ,  
b ecause i t  asserts only that security w ill exist when security is 
efficient--i ts gains in reducing uncertain ty exceed its costs--and 
will no t exist  when i t  is inefficient . 
Second , the uncertainty explanation pred icts that cred itors 
are less likely to take security in the assets of f irms that will 
probably be reorganized rather than l iquidated upon insolvency . 42 
This is b ecause when t he pos s iblity o f  reorganiza t ion is nonneglig ible 
the Bankruptcy Ac t may increase uncertainty by reducing the ab ility o f  
credi tors to calcula te t h e  expected value of security interest s  i n  the 
event o f  defaul t .  Ini tially , Federal law automatically s tays 
for eclosure when a bankruptcy peti t ion is f iled . 43  The stay ' s  purpose 
is to allow t ime to explore the possib il ity of reorganization, w i th 
losses to the secured credi tors supposedly be ing avoided by g iving 
them "adequa te pro tec t ion"--in terim cash paymen ts or replacemen t l iens 
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based o n  t h e  collateral's  worth . 4 4  To provide such protection , the 
collateral must of course be valued . The Ac t ,  however , chooses no 
valua t ion standard , rather leaving the ma t ter ent irely at the 
bankruptcy court's d iscretion . A court tha t is permit ted to choose 
between s tandards as dis para te as forced liquidation or full going 
concern value when dec id ing wha t the collateral is worth is likely to 
be influenced--indeed i s  encouraged to be infl uenced--by "equi table 
considera tions " ,  45  s uch as assis ting unsecured cred itors and equity 
holders b y  preserving the esta t e ' s  aasets as w ell as the pos sib ility 
o f  successful reo rganizatio n .  Because the bankruptcy court's
discret ion is so unconf ined , the value o f  the"pro tec t ion" a secured 
party will receive during the (also unspecified ) period in which 
foreclosure is  s tayed is hard to predic t ex ante . If a reorganiza t ion 
is  a t tempted , sec ured par ties commonly are offe red stock or deb t  in 
t he new enterprise . The value of this property also is hard to 
pred ic t when security i s  taken for two reasons . First , the debtor 
will never have opera ted in its  reorganized fo rm and it is thus hard 
to assess the expected value of claims on its earnings .  Second , the 
value of t he s tock or new debt offer tha t  equi t y  holders and unsecured 
cred i to rs will make to secured par ties to ob tain the ir consent to a 
r eo rgani za t ion i s  likely to be influenced by ( i )  the deb tor's actual 
prospec ts ; (ii) the desire of the equi ty and unsecured debt to g ive 
t he deb to r a second chance ; and (iii)  the ab ility of the secured 
par ties to obstruct the reorganiza tion . These factors too are qui te 
difficult to as sess when the ini t ial credi t extens ion is  made . 
Finally , c reditors canno t significantly increase the ir ab il i ty 
to calcula te the expected value of securi ty in the event of default by 
planning ab ini tio to d issen t from reorganization plans . Dissenters 
mus t rece ive cash or l iens as c ompensa t ion for the loss o f  rights 
under the ir secur i ty agreements , 4 6  but granting such c ompensation also 
requires bankruptcy courts to value the colla teral . In addit ion , the 
present value of the periodic cash paymen ts tha t  bankruptcy cour ts are 
authorized to make to dis sent ing secured parties must equal the 
"present value" of the secur i ty .  A court cannot calculate the 
requisi te payments without se t t ing a discount rate , however , and 
bankruptcy courts have wide d iscretion unconfined by sta tute or 
legisla t ive his tory , in choosing the "appropria te" rate . In 
consequence , c redito rs will seldom be able to increase significantly 
t he ir ab ility to calcula te t he present values of securi ty interests , 
and hence the present values of t he ir deb t  holdings, by planning to 
dis sent f rom reorganiza t ion plans should t heir  debtors become 
insolvent . 4 7  
Creditors of firms that are l ikely to b e  reorganized on 
default--large concerns , c ommon carriers--thus are likely to have 
difficul t y ,  when they take secured deb t ,  in knowing what their 
security will ultima tely be worth ; that is , the return from a secured 
loan may be as d if ficult to calculate ex ante as the return from an 
unsecured loan . Although securit y  may be valuable to t hese credi tors 
' 
for o ther reasons , i ts existence thus is unlikely to g enerate the 
ga ins from uncertainty reduct ion on which the uncertainty explana t ion 
rests . This explana tion thus pred ic ts tha t security is more likely to 
be taken when liq uida t ion is the probable outcome of de faul t .  Such a 
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pred iction i s  best verified by a statis t ical study , but  lacks support 
in the impres sionistic evidence; deal ing w i th the "problem" of secured 
credi tors , for example , is one of t he pr incipal subj ects of 
reorgani zation law, thus implying the frequency of secur i ty in this 
c ircumstance . And t he debtors some times are firms tha t credi tors 
apparently can foresee are unlikely to be l iquidated promptly on 
default . 48
Respecting the second difficulty with the uncertainty 
explana t ion , loan covenants seem substitutes for securi ty interests in 
reducing cred itor uncertainty; these c ovenants require firms to 
ma inta in working capi tal above s pecified amount s ,  l imit the extent to 
which firma can become claimholders in o ther b usinesses , restrict 
d ividend payment s and require t he maintenance of sinking f unds , al l of 
which help t o  ensure sufficient asse t "cushions" as significantly to 
s implify calcula t ing risks of default . 4 9  If securi ty actually 
performs the func tion of reduc ing uncertainty , this mus t be b ecause i t  
sometimes perfo rms this f unc t ion more cheaply than loan c ovenants do . 
No explanations of when and why security is cheaper than loan 
covenant s exist , however . In s um ,  because counterexamples apparently 
exist to the uncertainty theory and because the theory fails to 
explain why security is  taken , i t  too is unsa tis fac tory given the 
evidence that now exists . 
( 3 )  Heterogeneous Expectations Respecting Default 
The argument in Part I I  A that security fails t o  genera te ne t 
g ains for a firm presupposed tha t the firm's  c reditors assigned equal 
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probab ilities to default . If this assumption i s  relaxed , sec urity 
could increase wel far e .  To see why , recall that the premium which 
credi tors charge for bearing the risk o f  default was represented by 
the equa tion X • p (-P + bA) . The example above assumed tha t the 
deb tor had $ 100 in available assets and wished to borrow $ 1 1 0  from 
cred i to r  c1 and $90 f rom c2 ; each cred itor assigned a . 01 probab ility 
to default . Suppose instead that c1 chose a . 02 default probability . 
Then , using the equa tion, if both creditors are unsecured , the premium 
t hey w ill charge b ecause of the risk of default is $ 1 .55 , but if c1 is
secured the total premium drops to $ 1 . 10. And to general ize ,  it  is  
always ef ficient for t he f irm to secure the credi tor tha t  assigns the 
highest probab ility to d efaul t .  
Thia explanation ini tially seems plausible because a firm ' s  
credi tors could assign dif ferent probab ili t ies t o  t he likelihood o f  
defa ult . Th i a  i s  because the probab il i ty that a firm w i l l  default is  
a func t ion, inter alia , o f  the length and size of loans and no t all o f  
a firm ' s  deb t is  l ikely to b e  o f  the same length and size . The 
he terogeneous expec tat ions explanat ion , however , i s  difficult to 
confirm with the sparse data tha t now exists . The explana tion 
predicts that long term or large ' debt will be secur ed more frequently 
than short term or small deb t ,  but the issue is no t length o r  size 
s impl ici ter b ut whether length o r  size differs enough to generate 
differen t  default probab il ities on the par t  of c reditors . Thus the 
explana t ion is  no t neces sarily diaconfirmed by the prac t ice of firms 
whose financ ing is primarily short term often to issue some secur ed 
deb t  b ecause for part icular deb tors a s ix month loan could be long 
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term i f  t he ques t ion is  default probsbility. Nor i s  t h e  explanation 
necessarily disconfirmed by the prsc tice of some firms not to sell 
secured deb t at all although they obtain credi t fo r dif ferent per iod s 
or in different magni tudes ; such firms may never theless pose similar 
probab ili t ies of defaul t because of the ir earning capaci t ies or other 
fac to rs ,  Thus the heterogeneous expec tations explana tion i s  similar 
to the uncerta inty explana t ion in tha t  i t  is  internally coherent but 
is weakened by apparent counterexamples that themselves conceivably 
could be dissolved by adequate empirical inve s t iga t ion . SO 
F, Summary 
Ef fic iency explanations for the existence o f  secured deb t  
suf fer from one o r  more o f  t hree dif ficulties . First ,  they seem 
wrongly to pred ic t the absence or presence of secur i ty (monito ring 
costs , stagger ing debt , uncerta inty , he terogeneous expecta t ions) . 
Second , they fail to explain why c red i tors and firms use secur i ty 
rather than other devices (signal ing , risk aversion , uncertainty) .  
Third , they fail to show that the social gains from secured deb t  
exceed i t s  social costs (signaling) . To b e  sure , some o f  these 
explanations seem plausible in part icular c ircumstances , and this 
suggests t ha t  if t hey are combined a valid efficiency explana t ion of 
sec ured deb t can b e  developed . Combining explanations , however , is  an 
unsa tis factory response to the difficult ies tha t each explana t ion 
faces ; these explanations ac tually are theories , and the c ircumstances 
in which they do not apply or predict wrongly cons titute 
counterexamples tha t weaken their plausibility as theories . Thus wha t 
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now exis t s  i s  a set of weak theo r ies that seem to gain lit tle s trength 
by being added . In consequence , the effic iency j ustification fo r the 
current bankruptcy priori ty list is  unsatis fac tory in its present 
form . Befo re exploring the normative impl ications of this difficulty, 
we shall consider dis tributional explana t ions for the exis tence of 
security,  so as more fully to analyze the motivations of firms in 
granting i t .  
III · DISTRIBUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
A .  The "Offensive" Dist ribut ional Explanation 
Distributional explanations for the existence o f  secured deb t 
are of two rela ted kinds--the "offensive" and the "defensive11 . S l The 
fo rmer relaxes the assumption made in Par t  II A above tha t a firm ' s  
unsecured creditors are aware of security and react t o  i t s  issuance by 
raising the ir interest rates . Suppose that some of these c reditors 
fail to do this . Firms would then have an incentive to issue secured 
deb t  because they would benef i t  from the lower interest rates secured 
credi tors would charge but not be harmed by higher intere s t  ra tes 
charged elsewhere , In this c ircumstance ,  secured debt red istributes 
wealth from uninformed credi tors (who fail to react to securi ty) to 
firms . 52 Because firms would then be anxious to make secured loans , 
demand for t hese loans would increase ; thus secured credi tors-­
primarily banks and finance c ompanies--would share some o f  the gains 
made a t  t he expense o f  t he uninfo rmed credi tors . 
This d is tr ibutional explana tion pred ic ts tha t f irms will issue 
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secured debt when a subs tantial number of the ir credi tors are 
uninformed but not o therwise . The former pred iction has some 
empirical support . Consider retailers in cons umer markets.  A 
retailer's c reditors include not only its financers and sellers but 
also its c us tomers and employees . Res pec t ing c us tomers , one who buys 
from a retailer has a potential warranty claim. Further , hard good s ,  
such as appliances o r  cars , o f ten are bought with service contracts  or 
under the s tandard repair o r  replacement warranty .  Some c us tomers 
also may have made partial or full payment , and would be enti tled to 
res ti tution if t he goods are defec tive . Re tailers are deb tors 
respecting consumer warranty cla ims ; that is , c us tomers have poten tial 
claims against retailers for money o r  services , and the retailers have 
a corollary po tential l iability.  I f  asset s are withdrawn from the 
pool o therwise available to satisfy the warranty claims of cus tomers 
and devo ted to t he claims of different credi tors , t he purchase risks 
of the cus tomers are increased ; their claims against firms will be 
more dif ficult to sa tisfy. In consequence , purchases from "secured 
firms " are less a t trac tive than purchases from unsecured firms ; the 
former firms should thus command lower pr ices . These lower prices are 
the produc t market equivalent of t he higher interest rates that 
unsecured credi tors in financial markets charge to a firm that issues 
secured deb t .  But if  retail customers are unaware o f  the ex istence o f  
security,  the ir demand for the goods of secured firms will b e  
unaffected by i t .  These customers consequently will pay higher prices 
than t hey should pay , as  measured by their own (informed) pre ferences . 
The excess will be shared by retailers and their financers . Fur the r ,  
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c ustomer claims arise no t only from warranties b u t  also from the 
purchase of goods on "layaway" or the purchase of gift certificates or 
money o rder s . 5 3  Less frequently , cons umers can have tort cla ims or
claims for non or late del iver y .  
Employees a r e  c red itors f o r  their wages , and should receive 
higher wages , other th ings equal , from secured than from unsecured 
firms because security makes the former firms more risky to deal with . 
Retail employees , however , are less l ikely to be organized than 
manufac turing employees and more l ikely to b e  employed on a casual or 
seasonal basis . Thus t hese employees may have relatively less power 
and knowledge than manufac turing employees to d emand higher wages from 
secured firms , with the result t ha t  t hese firms (and t he ir financer s) 
may capture some of the wealth o f  the employees . 
Thus the of fensive distributional explanat ion seems correctly 
to pred ic t tha t firms will issue secured deb t when a substantial 
number of t he ir credi tors are uninformed , 54 It apparently wrongly 
pred ic ts the absence of security,  however , in cases when most of a 
firm's credi tors would be aware of security and could react to its 
existenc e .  This is because , as Par t  II B showed , when c redi tors are 
informed and capable , security genera tes no ne t intere s t  rate 
reductions for the firm. Thus t he offensive d istributipnal 
explana t ion predicts tha t  those indus trial firms whose sellers , buyers 
and financers all seem sophisticated will rarely secure the d ebt they 
sell . In practice , however , these firms o f ten issue some secured 
deb t .  This explanati,on the refore is also unconv inc ing . 
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B .  The ''Defensive" Distributional Explana tion 
The defensive distributional explanation assumes that 
credi tors are informed and c ompe tent , and goes like this : Suppose 
tha t  a c redito r is asked to lend unsecured to a firm tha t  has issued 
no secured debt . W il l  it charge an interes t ra te tha t  reflects the 
fac t that all of the firm ' s  assets are available to satisfy c reditor 
cla ims ? Perhaps not b ecause , i f  this r elatively low ra te is  charged , 
the firm has an incentive to issue secured deb t after the initial loan 
is  made . By so doing , it would obtain the advantage of the lower ra te 
secured deb t command s w i thout the d isadvantage of the higher rate 
unsecured credi tors would charge in response . Cred i tors , however , 
antic ipa t ing the later issuance of sec ured deb t ,  will charge the 
in terest ra te for unsecured debt tha t  would be charged i f  t he firm 
were al ready secured , 5 5  Bu t if this is done , the firm must promptly 
issue secured deb t ; only in this way can i t  offset the high interest 
rate tha t it is  required to pay because cred i to rs antic ipate that such 
debt will later be issued . Further , the two dis tributional 
explanations can be c ombined : Firms issue secured deb t  to defend 
themselves against informed credi tors who expect i t  and to exploi t  
uninformed c reditors who a r e  ignorant of i t .  
The "defensive" d i s tr ibutional explana t ion· suf fers from 
familiar d if ficulties . It predic ts that all firms ini tially will 
borrow secured , and will secure as much deb t  as t hey can . This is 
because if a firm's first cred i tor will charge an interest rate tha t 
reflects  la ter security , t he f irm should secure the firs t credi tor 
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(and all others so long as it has free assets);  in this way , it can 
receive the benef i t  of sec ured deb t ' s  lower interest rate as soon as 
possible . Noth ing is  ga ined and something lost by secur ing the 
seventh ra ther than the first c red i to r ,  when some c red itors will have 
to be secured in any even t .  Ye t many firms fa il to borrow accord ing 
to this pa t tern . 
A fur ther d ifficulty is tha t  firms to some ex tent can prevent 
early unsecured credi tors from charg ing interes t  ra tes tha t  reflect 
antic ipated sec ur i ty by using loan c ovenan ts . Common c ovenan ts 
prohibit  firms from issuing la ter debt wit h  a higher priority than 
early deb t ;  these prohib i tions sometimes spec ifically refer to 
p urchase money and real estate mor tgages . 5 6  In add i t ion,  c ovenants  
sometimes expressly pro tect early c red i tors against the later issuance 
of securi ty by providing that t he e arly credi tors "must have their 
pr io ri ty upgraded and be g iven an equal claim on the c ol lateral with 
t he secured debtholders11 . 5 7  Thus i f  security perfo rms t he f unction of 
forestalling ini tially high interes t rates , i t  must be because in some 
cases i t  does so more cheaply t han loan covenants would . Explana t ions 
of when and how this would occur are lacking . 
Nevert heless , t he defensive dis tribut ional explana t ion is  
normatively troubling if valid : should secur i ty generate no net 
in teres t ra te r eductions but be used to prevent credi to rs from
capturing the wealth of firms , the g iving of secur i ty represents a 
dead weigh t efficiency loss . No new wealth is crea ted by the iss uance 
of secur i ty ,  yet since resources are devoted to creating i t ,  someone 
is made wo rse off by i t s  exi stence.  
IV, NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND A RESEARCH AGENDA 
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Parts I I  and III  o f  this paper argue tha t  no convinc ing 
explanation for the issuance of short term secured deb t  exis t s ; it is 
not known with assurance whether security is efficient , as some 
explana tions of i t s  existence asser t ,  or inefficient ,  as the signaling 
and distribut ional explana tions suggest is pos sible . With the record 
in this state , it may seem appropriate for a decisionmaker to pursue 
wha tever norma tive views respect ing bankruptcy liquida tions he happens 
to hold . In par ticular , since Cong ress has already selec ted a set o f  
credi tors for special treatment ,  t he priority o f  t hese credi tors 
perhaps should be raised above tha t of secured parties , on the g round 
t ha t  a good case for s ubo rd ina t ing them has yet to be made . Such an 
ac tion,  or o thers ac tuated by similar motives , would now b e  premature 
because sa tis fac tory no rma tive reasons for altering current law also 
are hard to find . In consequence , Par t  IV first explores the law 
reform impl ica t ions t ha t  follow from a rej ec tion o f  the efficiency 
j ustification for the current bankruptcy p r ioity l is t .  I t  n ex t  
illus tra tes the difficult ies t h a t  make s igni ficant l a w  reform unwise 
at present . Final ly, Par t  IV concludes with a b rief summary of the 
impo rtant unresolved posi t ive and no rma t ive issues respecting 
bankruptcy l i quidations . 
A .  Possible Reforms 
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Suppose that the assump tion of credi tor knowledge and ability 
to reac t to securi ty is par tially false : some c red itors are 
disadvantaged by firm failures that they can neither foresee nor 
avoid . Two refo rms are then implie d ,  to prohib it security or make it  
much more dif ficult to take , o r  to eleva te the priority s ta tus in 
bankruptcy liquidations o f  par ticular c reditor g roups . The fo rmer 
reform is unwise . Ini tially , secured d ebt has no t been shown to be 
inefficien t ; the signaling and distribut ional explana tions indicate 
only t ha t  inefficiency is conceivable . Thus s ignificantly reducing the 
opportuni ty to take security seems precipitate . Fur the r ,  c reditors 
and firms are likely to want a good deal o f  security even a t  higher 
cost level s ,  as they did in pre Code days ; reducing the costs to many 
parties of doing what t hey would do anyway thus will produce some 
gains . Finally,  any harm tha t secured debt generates will fall 
heaviest on part icular unsecured credi tors . The freedom of firms and 
secured creditors is maximized if these c ommercial par ties are 
unregula ted but those disadvantaged by security are helped d irectly . 
All of t he se reasons suggest that the cost reducing innovations o f  
Article 9 should be preserved even if  t he assumption of credi tor 
knowledge is sometimes false . 
The appropriate response to c reditor igno rance is to elevate 
t he priority s ta t us of those credi tors thought deserving of help . At 
present , secured par ties are paid in ful l ,  to the ex tent of their 
security interests , before � other credi tors are pa id . Any law 
reform effort should alter this prio rity list : consumers , employees , 
small trade creditors , tor t  claimants or any others whom Congress 
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wants to favor should be paid firs t ,  either in full or up to 
sta tutorily created levels . Such a refo rm would increase the costs o f  
secured d eb t  because secured credi tors would be able t o  realize less 
on default and because g reater uncertainty will at tend the use o f  
securi ty since secured credi tors w ill have dif ficulty predict ing the 
extent to which t hey may later be subordinated . Never theles s ,  
revising priori t ies i s  preferable t o  increas ing the costs o f  secured 
deb t in o ther ways ; for priority revision helps direc tly those thought 
deserving of help and gives f irms and secured credi tors more freedom 
in arranging their affairs . 
B .  Issues t o  Be Resolved Before Revising the Priority List 
Tha t distributional o r  other norma tive obj ectives should be 
pursued more vigorously in bankruptcy contex ts than they now are fails 
to follow from a showing that securi ty conceivably is inef ficient . An 
affirmative law r eform case must be made b ecause pursui t of any such 
case is expensive . The case for revising priori ties seems s trongest 
when part icular c red ito rs are unaware o f  o r  cannot reac t to security . 
In this circums tance , firms and sophis t ica ted credi tors use secured 
deb t  wi th the possible intention and certain effec t of redistributing 
wealth to themselves and from credi tors who would prevent these 
redis tributions were they informed . Correc tive j ustice no tions imply 
a remedy for the disadvantaged credi tors in this circumstance . A 
correc tive j us t ice theory provides that a plaintiff cannot prevail 
aga ins t  a de fendant unless the de fendant has wrongfully harmed some 
interes t of the plaintiff , Such a theory must therefore identify 
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which interests "belong to" or are "owned" by the pla intiff a s  well as 
wha t ac tions "wrong fully" harm these in terests . Correc ti ve j us t ice 
theori sts give content to the concepts of in terest s  and wrongs by 
reference both to moral theories and to widely shared moral 
sen timents , 5 8  Res pect ing bankruptcy priority issue s ,  most moral
theories as wel l as commonly shared moral notions accord persons or 
business enti ties protectable interest s in property . Thus when wealth 
is redistributed from inept o r  uninformed creditors , their in terests 
prima facie have been invaded . Further , the moral sent iments of 
ord inary persons might consider the invasion to be wrongful; for it 
reflects the disadvantag ing of the weak by the strong . Thus 
correc tive j ustice notions could require unsophis ticated or ignorant 
credi tors to have a remedy against the firms and secured credi tors 
tha t harmed them. 
This correc tive j us t ice case does no t seem compelling because 
o rd inary persons probably would no t regard security as wrongful in the 
same sense tha t fraud or theft i s ,  par ticularly since secured par ties 
and firms some time s may fail to realize t ha t  they are inflict ing harm 
on o ther cred itors . Also , the harm that is done o ften seems 
relatively slight . A decisionmaker deciding whether to recognize a 
right on c orrec tive j ustice grounds is enti tled to consider the 
consequences t ha t  r ecogni tion would enta il . If securi�y were shown to 
be effic ient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense , 5 9  then , this efficiency would 
count agains t a corrective j us t ice right to a revised priority list; 
this is because pursuit of t his right would raise the costs and thus 
reduce the ga ins fro� security.  But a persuasive efficiency showing 
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has not been made and i n  i t s  ab sence a decisionmaker could j usti fiably 
pursue the plausible correc tive j us tice case for revising bankruptcy 
priori t ie s .  60
Be fore ac ting on this case , however , the fac tual accuracy of 
its premises must be shown , no t as serted . This i s  a difficult task . 
Plausibly establishing the incompetence of contrac ting par tie s ,  such 
as t he employees and consumers at issue here , is hard to do. 6 1  The 
incompe tence o f  employees is espec ially problematic when , as often 
happens , t hey are o rganized in unions . Further , i t  is not enough to 
show that � of these parties are uninformed because market s  can 
work w ell in t he face of substantial numb ers of uninfo rmed persons ; 
the informed employees and consumers , tha t is , in some cases may 
p ol ice t he market sufficiently to ensure that wages and prices 
accurately reflec t the existence of security. 62 Thus the seemingly 
p lausible corrective j us t ice case for revising bankruptcy priorities 
is in fac t  premature because the c ircumstances in wh ich it applies 
have yet to be established . 
When this case is inapplicable,  a persuasive normative 
argument for r evising bankruptcy priori t ies seems hard to f ind . To 
perceive the difficulties , consider "small" trade c reditors , who 
supposedly are among the class disadvantaged by c urrent law . These 
c reditors mus t now be assumed able to anticipate bankruptcy and learn 
of security ; for were t hese assump t ions false , such credi tors would be 
injured by secur i ty in the way the correc tive j us tice case suppose s .  
B u t  i f  t hese assumpt ions are true , the small trade credi tors have been 
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c ompensa ted fo r bearing the risk of a low priority status in 
bankruptcy b ecause the c ost of this risk will be an element of the 
marke t price t ha t  t he i r  buyers must pay . The trade credi tors would 
seem to need no state help in this c ircumstanc e .  Further , i f  
bankruptcy priorities were r evised , the c o s t s  t o  banks and finance 
companies of extend ing cred i t  would be raised , w i th the result tha t 
t hese ent i t ies might make fewer loans . This outcome would 
d isadvantage the employees and shareholders of the banks and finance 
c ompanies . On t he info rma t ion t ha t  now exist s ,  i t  is dif f icult to say
tha t  these persons are less "deserving" than the persons who own o r  
work for the small trade credi tors . No no rma t ive ground for revis ing 
bankruptcy p riori ties thus seems apparent except the correc tive 
j us t ice cas e .  
c .  Issues That Deserve S tudy 
The normative desirability of any bankruptcy priority list 
cannot be convincingly established on the basis of current knowledge . 
The conventional v iew that Ar ticle 9 and the Bankruptcy Ac t strike a 
des irable b alance between the in terests of secured and unsecured 
cred itors thus is serio us ly defi c ien t .  Before accept ing it or any 
other conclusion , research should be done on t he following issues : (i)  
Can explana tions o f  the existence o f  sec ured deb t be developed tha t 
are testable and account for much of t he observed da ta? (ii)  The 
observed data is largely the product of casual empiricism. Would 
rigorous empirical work confirm theories tha t now seem que s tionable o r  
ind icate possibilit ies o f  n e w  theo ries?  (iii)  When do the fac tual 
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premises o f  t h e  corrective j us t ice case hold ? ( iv) Apart from this 
case , c an a coherent normative argument for revising the bankrup tcy 
priority list be made? 
CONCLUSION 
Present bankruptcy law provides tha t secured par ties are to be 
paid f irs t and in f ull before any other credi tors o f  an insolvent 
deb tor are paid at all.  The principal j us ti fi cation for this priority 
list i s  t hat short term secured deb t  i s  ef f ic ient and thus should be 
made as convenient to buy as possible .  This j us t i fication has not 
been proved; no plausible showing t ha t  secured d eb t  actually increases 
welfare ex ists . Fur ther , firms in some c ircumstances may issue such 
d eb t  to redistrib ute wealth to themselves from j ust those persons to 
whom standard distribut ional rationales would accord special 
trea tment . If , in light of these conclusions , dif ferent no rma t-ive 
concerns should be pursued in bankruptcy liquidations , the appropria te 
method for doing so is to eleva te the priority s tatus of those thought 
to require more favorable treatment . But these conclusions do not 
t hemselves suppo rt such a course ; that t he effic iency j usti f ica t ion 
for present law is problematic means only that o ther concerns should 
become relevant , not paramount . Thus i t  is to the que s t ions whether 
the ef fic iency j ustification can be made persuasive and whether 
a t tr ac t ive no rma t ive cases for par t icular bankrup tcy priority lists 
can b e  made out that a t tention should now turn . Inquiries of this 
sort , i t  may be remarked , probably are appropria te in rela ted con texts 
as well because posi tivist explanations o f  several other legally 
so 
r elevant f inancial prac t ices also seem rela tively undeveloped . 
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E.  Scot t ,  Commerc ial Law : Princ iples and Policies ( forthcoming ) .
1 .  Charles w. Haley and Lawrence D. Schall , The Theory of Financial
Decisions 379-83 (2d . ed . 1 979 ) .  
2.  Cliffo rd w .  Smi th and Gerald B .  Warner , On Financial Contrac ting :  An 
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Handbook of Financial Economics 257  (James L .  Bicksler , ed . 1 979) . 
4 ,  Jeremy I .  Bulow and John B .  Shoven , The Bankruptcy Dec ision, 9 Bell J. 
Econ. 4 3 7  ( 1 978) . Fo r cri tical commen t , see James s. Ang and Jess H.
Chua , Cond itions , the Me-First Rul e ,  and the Liquidation Decision, 
1 1  Bell J. Econ . 355  ( 1 980) . 
5 .  Bankruptcy Reform Ac t of 1 978,  1 1  u. s . c. § 724 (b ) (l ) (herein cited
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as "Bankruptcy Act § ") . 
6 .  Bankrupt cy Ac t §507.  A useful general d iscuss ion o f  bankruptcy 
dis tributions , though da ted in detail , is James MacLachlan ,  Bankruptcy 
1 45-54 ( 1 95 6) .  
7 ,  Securi ty could be e ffic ient in the pareto superio r  or Kaldor-Hicks 
sense . To perceive t he dif ference , suppose tha t  a security in terest 
reduces the risks of a secured cred itor by more than it increases the 
risks of unsecured creditors and consider two cases . First , all 
c red itors are aware o f  the existence of sec uri ty; consequen tly,  the 
secured credi tor charges lower interest ra tes t han it  would have charged 
if  it had no t taken security whil e  the unsecured c red itors charge higher 
in terest ra tes than they would have charged if no security exis ted . 
Since in this illustra tion the b enefits of the in terest rate reduc tion 
exceed t he costs o f  t he ra te increases by assumption , security is ( almost)  
par eto superior; the d eb to r  and secured cred itor are made bet ter off by 
its exis tence while actual unsecured credi tors are as well o f f  as without 
sec urity because they are paid to bear the increased risks that sec uri ty 
imposes . Some risk averse persons , however , may be discouraged from 
lend ing . Second , suppose tha t some actual unsecured cred itors charge the 
same interest ra tes t hey would have charged had no secured deb t  been 
issued because they are too unsophisticated to reac t appropriately to 
security.  In  this case , secured deb t  makes these unsophi�tica ted
creditors worse o ff because their risks are increased but they receive 
no addi tional compensat ion. Security would nevertheless be efficient in 
the Kaldor-Hicks sense; the gainers from securi ty--the deb tor and secured 
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credi tor--could compensate the losers--the unsophi s t ica ted credi tor s--and 
remain better off t han wi thout security.  This is t rue by the assumption 
that security reduces the r isks o f  t he secured party by more than i t  
increases the r isks o f  the unsecured c reditors . The normative effic iency 
defense of the Code and Bankruptcy Ac t is obviously stronger if secured 
deb t were shown to be ( almost )  pareto superior to unsecured deb t when 
security was taken. See text at notes 58-60, infra . 
8 .  "Middle term" deb t ,  outs tanding for one to five years , is sometimes 
secured with he avy industrial machinery. This debt seems less 
significan t  in volume than the short and long term deb t tha t the text 
discusse s . 
9 ,  See William Husband and John Dockery , Modern Corporate Finance ,  1 1 3- 1 4  
(7th ed . 1 9 72 ) ,  
1 0 .  A good descript ion o f  this financing i s  found in James Van Horne , 
Financial Management and Policy , 4 58-69 and 4 76-77 (4th ed . ,  1 977) . 
Unsecured trade cred i t , however , is the largest single source of 
shor t-term corpora te deb t .  In f irst quarter 1 97 6 ,  for example , trade 
deb t was 106. 9 billion dollars , over twice the amount o f  sho rt term 
liabili t ies to banks . Schwartz and Whi tcomb , supra note 3, at 2 5 7 .  
See also Van Horne a t  43 7-3 9 .  
1 1 .  This law i s  described in detail in Grant Gilmore , Security Interes ts 
In Personal Property 24-286 ( 1 9 65 ) . 
1 2 .  The c oounent to §9-101  recite s :  
The aim of this Ar ticle i s  t o  provide a simple and unified 
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s tructure within which t he immense variety of present-day 
secured financing can go forward wi th less cost and g reater 
certainty , 
1 3 .  Comment 2 to §9-2 04 refers to "a feeling , often inar ticulate in the 
[jud icial] opinions [ prior to the Code] , tha t  a c omme rcial borrower 
should no t be allowed to encumber all his assets present and future , 
and that for t he pro tection no t only of the borrower but of his 
other c reditors a c ushion of free asse ts should be preserved . "  
The comment s ta tes that this "premise has much to recommend it"  but 
is  rej ec ted in Ar ticle 9 because secured cred i tors had ac tually 
managed to l ien everything : "The cushion of free assets was not 
preserved . "  I d .  Professor Coun tryman , a strong critic of the Code,  
had a dif ferent view of its  effec t :  
My theme for today i s  inspired by wha t many prac ti tioners 
and bankruptcy referees tell me about the impac t of the 
Uniform Commerc ial Code upon bankruptcy proceeding s .  They 
report that with the Code now in effect in every s ta te but 
Louisiana , more and more bankruptcy cases emerge wi th every 
scrap of t he bankrupt 's p roperty covered by some sort of a 
Code secur i ty interest so that no thing is left even for 
t he payment o f  expenses o f  adminis tra t ion . That means , o f  
course , tha t  no thing will be distributed t o  a�y unsecured 
credi tor , wi th or without priori t y .  
Vern Countryman , Code Secur i ty Interests in Bankruptcy,  7 5  Comm. L. J, 
269 ( 1 9 70 ) , Professor Coun tryman ' s  view o f  the Code ' s  ef fect is shared 
by the leading 9ankruptcy treatise . See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy,  
55 
V3 63. 0l (15th ed . 1 9 7 9 ) . A claim that unsecured credi tors should 
receive more favorable treatment in bankruptcy than they now do can 
be maintained even if the Cod e ' s  historical view is correc t .  
1 4. §9-2 03 (1 ) • Agreements to g ive possessary security interes ts , in 
which the credi tors take physical possession of the colla teral , may 
be o ral . .!!!• Apa r t  from pledges of financial instruments , possessary 
security in terests have little commercial signi f icance . 
1 5 .  § 9-1 1 0. Th e  accompanying comment s ta tes that "courts should refuse 
to follow the hold ings , o f ten found in the older cha t tel mortgage 
case s ,  tha t  descriptions are insufficient unless they are of the most 
exact and detailed nature , , . . " 
16.  § 9-4 01 ; § 9-402 . The Code thus is  a "notice fil ing" statute , where "the 
notice it sel f  ind ica te s  merely that the secured party who has filed 
may have a security interest in the col lateral described . Further 
inquiry from the par t ies concerned will be necessary to di sclose the 
complete sta te of a ffairs . "  Comment 2 to § 9-4 02 . 
1 7. See Comment 1 to § 9-204. 
18 .  §9-204 ( 1 ) .  
1 9 .  Bankruptcy trustees h a d  claimed under the o l d  Bankruptcy Ac t tha t 
securi ty interests in a fter-acquired property were preferential b ecause 
when the deb tor took possession o f  collateral wh ich became subj ec t to a 
previously granted security interest , the deb tor in ef fect was 
transfer ring property to the c red itor for an antecedent deb t ;  the d ebt 
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was the orig inal credi t ex tension . The c ircui t courts rej ected this 
claim, al though on rather quest ionable ground s .  See ,  � ·  Du Bay V •
Williams 4 1 7  F . 2d 1 2 7 7  (9th cir . 1 96 9 ) ; Grain Merchants o f  Indiana V •
Un ion Bank and Savings Co . ,  408 F . 2d 209 ( 1 969) , Cert . denied 396 
u. s .  82 7 (1 970) . The Bankruptcy Ac t ,  in §54 6 (c) , elimina ted all
doubt by provid ing tha t promptly p er fected after-acquired security 
interest s  in accounts receivable and inventory were not pre ferent ial . 
This development is extensively d iscussed in Anthony T. Kronman , The 
Treatment of Security Interests in After Acquired Property Under the 
Proposed Bankruptcy Ac t ,  1 2 4  Penn L.  Rev . 1 1 0  ( 1 975 ) ,  
2 0 .  §9-403 (2) . 
2 1 .  A Code sec uri ty agreement may authorize the secured par ty to make 
"f uture advances" on the orig inal c ollateral . §9-2 04 (3) • See also 
Comment 5 to §9-204 . 
2 2 .  Secured creditors d o  worse than this description suggests i f  a possiblity 
exists that the deb to r  may b e  r eo rganized rather t han liquida ted . 
Section 3 62 of the Bankruptcy Ac t automatically s tays the enforcemen t o f  
sec urity interests o n  t h e  filing o f  a bankruptcy peti t ion . The s tay 
wil l  be terminated in a month i f  t here is no prospec t o f  an effec tive 
r eo rganizat ion , but court s are qui te lenient in g iving deb tors t ime 
to come up with reorganization plans . Thus even when no reorganization 
I 
occurs , secured credi tors may have to wait six months or more to 
foreclose . While courts are supposed to accord "adequa te pro tec tion" 
to secur ed parties during this in ter im, Bankruptcy Act § 3 6 1 ,  
they may not d o  so . See text a t  notes 43-4 7, infra .  Furthe r ,  i f  
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the deb tor actually is  reorgan ized , the secured cred i to r  may b e  
required t o  take stock i n  the new enterpr ise . While the face 
value o f  t he s tock o ften equals the value of the unpaid deb t ,  the shares 
of reorganized firms commonly trade at large discounts . See Jerald B .  
Warner , Bankrup tcy , Ab solute Priority and the Pric ing of Risky 
Debt Claims , 4 J, Financial Econ . 239 at note 6 ,  P •  244 ( 1 97 7 ) . 
Nevertheless , secured credi tors seem to do rela t ively bet ter than 
general credito rs , even g iven the poss iblity or fac t o f  reorganizations . 
23.  A standard authority asserts that firms that  pose a nonnegligible risk 
of d efault o ften "cannot ob tain credit on an unsecured basis • • , • 
In o rder to make a loan , lenders require security  so a s  to r educe their 
risk o f  loss . "  Van Horne , supra note 10, a t  458. This explanation 
presupposes tha t  credi tors would refuse loans rather than lend unsecured 
at higher interest rate s . The assumption is common b ut undefended . 
Its val idity is no t relevant to the analysis about to be made , which 
focuses on the response of unsecured creditors to the existence o f  
security . 
24. ucc § § 9-503,  9-504.
25. Should a firm become bankrupt , its cred i tors are pa id on a pro rats
basis 1 i f  t he f irm owes $ 1 00 in total , $10  of which i s  owed to 
cred itor A, c reditor A i s  enti tled to ten percent o f  the firm's
assets to sa tisfy its claim. The text ' s  equa t ion presupposes a 
bankruptcy liquidation because this is wha t the textual equa tion gran t s .
If credi tor A c ol lected before bankruptcy and before other credi tors , 
however , i t  might be paid in full . On the o ther hand , i f  creditor A were
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last on line in a pre-bankruptcy distribut ion , it would get nothing . Thui 
the tex t ' s  equa tion is inaccurate in presupposing a bankrup tcy s tyle 
liquida t ion : t he equa t ion should instead define the expec ted value 
of the asse ts available to a c reditor on default by use of a set o f  
terms charac teriz ing t h e  respec t ive likelihoods and probable payoffs 
of a bankruptcy dis trib ut ion as contrasted wi th a first come first 
served distribution . The text uses the simpler equa t ion because i t  
a ids exposi tion without vitiating the point f o r  which t h e  equation i s  
used.  Also , ins titutional arrangement s make bankruptcy style 
liquidations likely . In particular , Sections 54 7 and 548 of t he 
Bankruptcy Ac t require credi tors to t urn over to the bankrup t estate 
payments received by them sho rtly before bankrupt cy and made while 
t he debtor was insolvent . Because o f  these sec t ions , creditors may 
o ften anticipate bankrupt cy s tyle l iquidations when calculating risks
of defaul t .  
26.  The assumpt ions that the text makes are similar to the assumptions 
underly ing the famous proof tha t  in a perfec t capi tal marke t a f irm 
cannot increase i ts value b y  al tering its capi tal str ucture . See 
Haley and Schal l , supra no te 1 ,  at 280. The argument above may be
thought o f  as a proof tha t  a firm cannot increase i t s  value by varying 
t he nature of i t s  deb t  instruments . Thia analysis does not depend on 
the ab il i ty o f  inves tors to arbi trage b etween firms but rather on the 
ab ility of a f irm' s credi tors to vary interest rates wi th changes in 
the nature of t he firm's d eb t .  I f  the c reditors could no t d o  this , 
arbi trage pos s ibili t ies are likely to yield the same result . Also , 
the argument above , unlike the standard irrelevance proof,  i s  robust 
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to the existence of corpora te taxes since the tax laws permit the 
deduc tab ility o f  interest on both secured and unsecured deb t ,  A 
variety of deb t  instruments do exist , however , so the text goes 
on to explore possible explanations of this fac t .  
2 7. Moni toring cost explana t ions for the existence o f  secured deb t  are found 
in Thomas Jackson and Anthony T. Kronman , "Secured Financing and 
Priori ties Among Creditors , 89 Yale L . J ,  1 1 43 ( 1 9 7 9 )  and Clifford w. 
Smi th. and Jerald B. Warner , Bankruptcy,  Secured Deb t ,  and Optimal 
Capi tal S tructure : Comment ,  34 J, Fin . 247 (1 979) . 
28 .  The Jackson and Kronman paper , which was the first  in  the l egal 
li terat ure to r ec ognize that the existence of secured debt was a 
problem tha t had to be explained , fails to g iven an account of why 
credi tor s '  moni toring costs would change at different ra tes when 
their prio ri ty posi tions chang e .  
2 9 ,  This explanation follows from the Smith and Warner paper , supra note 27,  
which claims t ha t  secured deb t  is issued because it "is one way of 
precl uding asse t substi tution by borrowers . "  lli a t  250. 
30.  The costs o f  misbehavior t o  d eb tors vary d irectly with t he ease with 
which potential creditors can learn tha t misbehavio r occurred . In 
small towns , few ins titutional lenders exist and communica tion among 
these l enders consequently is easy relative to communication among 
lenders in large ci ties . As a resul t ,  the good will sanc t ion is 
apparen tly effec tive against any small town firm primarily using short 
term f inanc ing t ha t  con templa tes remaining in business over time . Yet 
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such firms some times issue short term secured deb t .  The monitoring 
cost explanation , however , predicts that this practice would seldom 
occur . Cred i tors also may monitor to prevent fraud--for example, 
selling property subj ec t to an inventory security in terest to a consumer , 
which is permi t ted , but  no t remi t t ing the agreed port ion of the proceeds 
to the secured cred i tor , which is prohib ited . Securi ty interest s 
apparently would not r educe the risk of such fraud by much , and so do 
not seem substitutes for monitoring direc ted at i t .  
3 1 .  This statement seems too broad , for retailers some times can increase 
the risk of t he ir enterprise relatively easily by varying the nature o f  
t he ir inven tory--to hula hoops from children' s  blocks . A security 
interest in such a firm ' s  inventory , however , would no t ma terially reduce 
the risk of this conduct . Inven tory security interests permi t firms to 
sell the good s ,  wi th the security in teres t shifting to the proceed s of 
sal e .  Thus t he f irm could sell the blocks i t  owned ini t ially , and the 
securi ty interest would no t bar it from replacing them wi th hula hoops . 
In short term loans , t herefore , security would not reduce the risk of 
asset sub s t i tutions in one of the princ ipal cases in which they might 
arise . Pro fessors Jackson and Kronman sta te that security is more likely 
to be issued in connec tion with long term loans than wi th short term 
loans , but do no t no te the difficul t ies that this possibility crea tes 
for a monitoring cost explanation of sho rt term secured deb t .  See 
Jackson and Kronman , supra note 2 7 ,  at 1 1 5 9 .  
32 . See Sudipto Bha t tacharya , Imper fec t Info rmation,  Dividend Policy and 
the 'Bird in the Hand ' Fallacy , 1 0  Bell J, Econ . 259 (1 979) 
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(explaining the iss uance of dividends as a signal to credi tors 
of a firm ' s  owners'  true estimate of fut ure earnings) ; Stephen Ross , 
The De termina t ion of Financial Structure : The Incentive-Signall ing 
Approach , 8 Bell J, Econ . 23 ( 1 97 7 )  (same ) ; Hayne E. Leland and 
David H. Pyle , Info rma t ion Asymme tries , Financial S tructure , and 
Financial Intermed ia tion , 32 J, Fin . 371  ( 1 97 7 )  (explaining the 
equi t y  posi t ion t ha t  a firm' s owners take as a s ignal to cr edi tors o f  
the owner s '  true estimate o f  the profi tab ility o f  the firm ' s  proj ects ) . 
See al so , S tephen Ros s ,  Some No tes on Financial Incentive-Signalling 
Models , Ac tivity Choice and Risk Preferences , 33 J, Fin . 2 2 7  ( 1 978 ) . 
The evidence relevant to the dividend signaling explana t ion 
s eems inconclusive . See Thomas Copeland and J, Fred Weston,  
Financial Theory and Corporate Policy 359-62 ( 1 979) . 
33. 'lbe example is derived from A. M. Spence , Market Signal ing : Informational
Trans fer in Hiring and Rela ted Screening Proces ses , 1 6-20 ( 1 974) . 
34.  For those interested in how the numbers work out , a firm in Group I 
would signal Y • 0 when y • $7 b ecause i t  would cos t this firm $7 to 
send the signal while the signal would generate an interest rate 
r educ t ion of only $5 ( from $ 1 0  to $ 5 ) . A f irm in Group I I  would signal 
X. because i ts signaling coat is  Y/2 • $ 3 . 50 and the signal yields
a ra te r educt ion of $5. A Group II firm would not issue a security 
in teres t worth more than $ 7  because c redi tors in the exampl e  
above charge $5 t o  all firms that s ignal $7 o r  more ; thus send ing a 
signal wo rth more than $ 7  would generate no gains . 
3 5 .  See , �· Leland and Pyle , supra no te 3 2 ;  John G .  Riley , Info rma tional
36.  
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Equilibrium, 4 7  Econometrica 3 3 1  (1 979) . 
Ross makes the same criticism of Leland and Pyl e ' s  model ,  which assertE 
that t he equity posi t ions owners take in their  own firms operate as 
signal s of the owner s '  true predic tions of the ir firms ' prospec t s .  SeE 
Discus s s ion,  32 J, Fin . ( 1 977) . 
3 7 ,  Economists a t tempt t o  establ ish the nature o f  equi l ibria in their model 
because an equilibrium i s  a predict ion of wha t ac t ual market outcomes 
look l ike . If an analyst cannot charac terize the features that a 
p ar t icular market would have in equil ibrium, the analyst will have 
difficulty assessing the wel fare impl ication of t he features he ac tuall 
ob serves . For example , if one lacks a theory of wha t a credi t market 
looks l ike in compe t i tive equilibrium he will find it hard to decide 
whe t her t he particular credi t markets that he sees are behaving 
competi tively or no t .  The instab il i ty p roperties o (  signal ing equilibr 
are now well known. See Riley , supra note 3 5 ;  John G . Riley , Compe t i t iv 
Screen ing , 1 0  J, Econ . 'lb .  1 74 ( 1 975 ) ; Michael Ro thschild and Joseph 
E. Stigli t z ,  Equilib rium in Competitive Insurance Markets : An 
Essay on the Economics of Imper fec t Information , 90 Q• J, Econ. 
629 ( 1 9 76) , The equilibrium concept employed in all of these 
models is the Nash equi l ibrium: a sys tem wil l  be in a Nash 
equilibrium if each actor in it will maximize expec ted utili ty by 
pursuing his or her chosen strategy given tha t all other ac tors continui 
to pursue t heir  chosen s trateg ies . In this c ircums tance , the sys tem is 
at an equilibrium ,  for no one in i t  has an incentive to do o ther than 
what they are do ing . A set of strategies could no t consti t ute an 
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equilibrium if a t  least one ac to r has an incent ive to vary hie or her 
strategy,  given tha t o ther ac tors continue to pursue their strategies . 
For a further explanat ion o f  the Nash equilibrium concept , see Alan 
Schwartz and Louis L. Wild e ,  In tervening in Marke ts on the Basis of 
Imperfect Info rma t ion : A Legal and Economic Analysis ,  1 2 7  u.  Penn . L .
Rev . 630, 640-4 1 ( 1 979 ) .  
38. This argument may b e  made clearer wi th pic tures . [Continued on next 
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In the marke t ,  an interest rate of ! in Figure 2 B i s  paid to c reditors 
who signal .X.• Suppose a credi to r bids R0 , which is j usti fied by the 
average quality Z0 in the in terval !• • • Z in Figure 2 A .  This c red itor 
makes no ex tra profits from f irms in t he interval , b ecause the average 
quality of t he ir pr�j ec te correlates with a b id of R0 • The bid,  however , 
is a t tractive to f irms in the interval Z to j ust  before Z' because
R0 < !_; these higher qual ity f irms also signal .X. because the costs to 
them of signaling Y '  are not j us t i fied by the dif ference be tween R ' ,  the 
rate for Y ' ,  and !• Because these relatively high quality firms also 
borrow from the c;edi to r  tha t  b ids R 0 , the average quality of the firms 
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this credi tor gets i s  above Z 0 ; thus the bid R 0  ensures the creditor 
a net gain . This creditor need no t be particularly astute ; naive 
experimenta t ion by. credi tors , who vary the ir b ide out o f  ignorance o f  
the market price o r  t o  see what happens , could produce equil ibrium 
breaking b ids . The unravell ing the text and this no te describe occurs 
because the signaling variable in supposedly discontinuous ; that is , 
no t every slight increase in proj ect quality i s  matched by a 
correspond ing increase in the signaling level . If secur i ty in teres t 
signals are discontinuous , a part icular signal will apply to a range 
of qual ity level s ,  as the unravelling argument assumes . Secur i ty 
interest s ignals are like to have some discontinui ty b ecause of the 
d if ficulty of prec isely matching inc reases in the col lateral subj ec t 
to them wi th increases in t he quality of firm proj ects .  
39, See Riley , supra note 35,  a t  343-46 .  
4 0. Leland and Pyle,  supra note 3 2 ,  claim t ha t  finance marke t equilibria 
wil l  no t unravel at the lower bound . .!.!!• a t  379, n .  1 1 .  To see the ir 






Figure 3 presupposes that firms b ring proj ects to marke t but do no t 
signal b ecause at prevail ing in teres t  ra tes their proj ects are of 
such poor qual ity tha t  the costs of signal ing exceed the gains ; these 
f irms are on the signal ing schedule FF slight to t he left o f  the Z 
axis . When a c red i tor in this c ircumstance o ffers a new b id to the 
low quality firms t ha t  are signal ing y (bide R0 < _!t) , i t s  b id will 
cause some o f  the noneignaling firms to signal y; for at R0 the proj ec ts 
of t hese firms will , earn posi t ive returns given t he signal Y• In
I 
consequence of the po tential appearance o f  these low qual ity f irms , a 
credi tor who bide R0 is not ass ured of making ga ins because it will 
at trac t below average as well as above average firms . Thus Leland and 
Pyle assert that the credi tor has no incentive to break the signaling 
equi librium by bldding R 0 ;  the equil ibrium wi ll no t unravel from below.
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This assertion is  inaccura te . If low quality nonsignal ing firms 
ac tually are in the market and would signal y i f  a c red itor b ids R 0, 
the "end point" is actually a mid point , and t he equilibrium would 
unravel or no t depend ing on the slope of the quality distribut ion . 
Speci f ically , i f  t he slope were such that a bid of R0 would a t tract 
more high than low qual ity firms , unraveling would occur . Leland and 
Pyle are corr ect , however , in ob serving that i f  the supply of low 
qual ity nonsignaling firms is  suff ic iently elastic around the lower 
end point , a signal ing equilibrium will not necessarily unravel from 
below. 
4 1 .  Jackson and Kronman , supra note 27,  also critic ize the risk aversion 
explana t ion on this ground . See id . at 1 1 5 2 ,  n .  39 a t  40. 
4 2 .  Smith and Warner also assert that the probab il ity of secur i ty varies 
inversely with the probability o f  reorganizat ion , but rest this claim 
on the ab ility of bankruptcy courts to "prohibi t  the bondholders from 
taking pos ses sion of the property . "  Smith and Warner , supra note 2 ,  
a t  1 9. Bankruptcy cour t s ,  however , are required to compensa te 
bondholders for this los e ,  so Smith and Warner must go on to show tha t 
the c ompensa tion will be inadequa te . Bankruptcy lawyers do bel ieve 
this o f ten to be true . These authors also do no t ask whether the 
Bankruptcy Ac t ' s  tendency to increase uncertainty also reduces the 
incent ive of credi tors to take security when t he ir deb tors are likely 
to be reo rganized . 
4 3 .  Bankruptcy Act § 3 62(a) (4) . 
44. Bankruptcy Ac t §§  362 , 361 . 
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45. The Senate explained the decision not to put valua t ion cri teria in the
s ta tute as follows : 
Neither is i t  expected tha t the c ourts wil l  construe 
t he term value to mean , in every case , forced sale 
l iquidation value or full going concern value . There 
is wide la titude between these two extremes although 
forced sal e  value will be a minimum • • • •  [ T ) he 
determina t ion of which entity shall be enti tled to the 
dif ference b etween the going concern value and the 
liquida t ion value must b e  based on equitable considera tions 
arising from the fac ts of the case . 
Bankrup tcy Reform Ac t of 1 978,  Sena te Report No . 95-989 at P • 54 (1 978) , 
46.  Bankruptcy Ac t § § 1 1 29 (b) (i ) and 1 1 2 9 (b) (2 ) (A) . 
4 7 .  Valua t ion d i f f icul ties i n  reorg�niza t ion contexts have b ecome notorious . 
See Vic to r  Brudney and Ma rvin A. Chirelete in , Corporate Finance Cases 
and Ma terials 1 3 7-42, 158-63 (2nd ed . 1 979) . 
48.  For example , bondholders in c ommon carrier bankruptcie s  often are 
secured . See , .£..!.&!.• New Haven Inclusion Case s ,  399 u . s .  392 ( 1 969) . 
See also In Re Yale Express , 384 F . 2d 9 90 (2nd Cir .  1 96 7 ) . 
4 9 .  A thorough description o f  loan covenant s  i s  contained i n  Smith and 
Warner , supra note 2 .  The existence o f  loan c ovenant s  as substitutes 
for security in terest s  al so cuts aga inst the validity o f  the moni toring 
cost explana tio n .  See text a t  notes 2 7-3 1 ,  supra . 
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SO. Lawyers some t imes argue that security is  des irable b ecause it  enables
firms in financial d ifficulty to borrow rather than go bankrupt . This 
argumen t  runs more to justifying some fo rms of securi ty than to 
explaining the ex istence of secur i ty i t sel f  because many f irms issue 
secured d eb t  before they are in trouble . Al eo , when a firm is having 
d if ficulties i t s  asse ts often seem to be l iened ; thus this bankrup tcy 
avoidance argument actually purports to j us tify "s uper priori ties", in 
which later secured lenders ob ta in prio rity over earlier secured lenders 
in assets t ha t  are subj ect to the earlier secured lenders '  security 
interest s .  Th e  Code c reates such priorities and the Bankruptcy Ac t 
ra t i fies them. See UCC § § 9-301  end 9-3 1 2  (purchase money security 
interests)  and § 9-308 (purchasers of cha t tel paper ) .  The Code ' s  rules 
would be j ustifiable on efficiency grounds if the earl ier secured 
c red i tors would volun tarily have subordinated themselves to the later 
secured credi tors ; in this c ircumstance , the Code ' s  crea t ion of super 
prio ri ties would ac tually represent the drafting of subordination 
agreements fo r the parties , and would thus eave transac t io n  costs . 
No good reasons are apparent , however , as to why early secured creditors 
would coaunonly agree to subordinate their l iens to later secured 
c reditors when their coaunon deb tors are in d ifficul ty . Ano ther 
efficiency j usti f ica t ion for the Code and Bankruptcy Act is possible , 
however . Suppose tha t a deb to r ' s  going concern value would exceed its  
liquida t ion value i f  the  deb tor could get cash with which to continue , 
but t ha t  no c reditor would lend unless i t  received the highest priority.  
In this case , grant ing priority would b e  optimal for t he g roup of 
earlier cred i tors , but agreeing to the priority might not be opt imal 
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for a part icular e arly secured credi tor ; such a credi tor perhaps could 
do bet ter by fo reclosing against a shaky deb tor then by taking its 
chances in a lower priori ty posi t ion than i t  had previously enj oyed . 
The Code's  granting of e super prio rity posi tion to the later cred itor 
in return for lending new funds may therefore be ef ficient ; i t  would 
permit the deb tor to continue and thus l ead to the o pt imal outcome for 
the credi tors es e group . 
Thie effic iency story is promising but hes difficulties . First , 
it fa ils to explain why t he parties generally issue security but rather 
justifies the law ' s  pro tec tion of secur i ty interes t s  in par tic ular 
c ircumstances . Second , t he s tory presupposes that later cred i tors 
would lend wi th security but would no t make loans at interest rates 
t ha t  adequately c ompensated them for the risks they would take if they 
lent unsecured . The assumption apparently needs j us ti ficatio n .  Third , 
this efficiency s tory fails to j ustify present state law b ecause the Code 
grants super prio rities to secured deb t i ssued by deb to rs in complete 
financial health : a purchase money secured party , for example ,  takes 
prio ri ty over an after-acquired property f inancer regard less of the 
deb tor's f inancial status.  The Bankruptcy Act ,  however , allows a 
bankruptcy trus tee who is opera ting the d eb to r ' s  business during 
bankruptcy proceedings to sell debt senior to exist ing deb t  only i f  
this is  essential t o  the deb tor's  continuance (and t f  t he early 
secured parties r eceive "adequa te protection") . § 3 64 (d)  • Theories 
focusing on the c onsequences of dissolving the deb to r  thus may have 
promi se for ult ima tely explaining and j ust ifying aspects of bankruptcy 
l iquidation law. ' 
/1 
A final pos sible efficiency explana tion of secured debt is that 
secur i ty reduces collec tion costs ; a secured cred itor need no t sue a 
debt to j udgment and execute on its  deb tor's  asse t s ,  nor need it  
par t ic ipa te in a bankrup tcy liquidation ; rathe r ,  the c reditor can simply 
take t he property s ubj ect to its  l ien . See UCC § 9-503. This explana tion 
suf fers from the same d if ficulties as some of those described above.  
In part icula r ,  c ollection costs apparently vary inversely with the 
size o f  t he asse t pool;  that is , the more asse ts there are the easier 
it i s  to collect a debt . Thus when a cred i to r  removes as sets from the 
coDD11on pool , the c ol lection c osts of unsecured cred i to rs rise . The 
issue t hen is whet her the decline in the secured credi tor ' s  expected 
collec tion costs exceeds the rise in the unsecured cred itors' expected 
c ollec t ion costs . The answer to this question is no t obvious . Al so , 
secured parties o ften cannot foreclose when their deb tors default 
because the Bankruptcy Act continues t he colla teral in the deb to r ' s  
possession t o  preserve the possiblity of reorganiza tion . See tex t a t  
notes 43-4 7 ,  supra . 
5 1 .  Bo th explanations are desc ribed in James Ho Scot t ,  Bankruptcy , Secured 
Debt , and Opt imal Capital S tructure:  Reply, 34 J, Fin . 253  ( 1 979)  and 
James Ho Scot t ,  Bankruptcy,  Secured Deb t and Optimal Capi tal Structure , 
3 2  Jo Fin o 1 ( 1 977) 0 
5 2 .  The text supposes an "uninformed creditor" to be ignorant of the 
exis tence of securi ty or not sophist ica ted enough to respond 
appropriate ly to security if he or she knows o f  i t .  
53. The new Bankruptcy Ac t accords fifth priority to
". , , ind ividuals ,  to the extent of $900 for each 
such individual , arising from the deposit • of
money in connection wi th the purchase , l ease or ren tal 
of property , or the purchase of services , for the 
personal , family or household use o f  such individual s ,  
that were not delivered or provided . "  
7 2  
§ S07 (a) (5 ) ,  Fifth prio rity claimants are unlikely to do wel l .
5 4 ,  The of fensive distribut ional explana t ion can coexist wi th explanations 
tha t  claim secured deb t to be effic ient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense . See 
not e  7 ,  supra . 
55.  If  cred itors suppose the probab ility tha t  a firm will issue security 
after a loan is made to be less than one , the firm can exploit t hese 
c red itors by issuing security . This is because a probability figure 
less than one implies an intere s t  ra te tha t  does not f ully reflect 
the ex istence o f  security ; in this case , the firm can make gains by 
later issuing it . Thus early credi tors have an incentive to 
assume tha t  later secured deb t will be issued with a probab ility o f  
one , a s  t h e  text supposes . Credi tors , however , d o  have incentives 
to set realistic probab ility figures ; if those figures exceed zero , 
t he defensive distri�utional explana t ion nevert heless holds . 
5 6 .  Smith and Warner , supra note 2, at 32-34. 
5 7 ,  Id . at 3 2 .  
5 8 .  See , �· John Borg9,  Causal Parad igms in Tort Law, 8 J, Leg . Stud . 
7 3  
4 19 (197 9 ) ; Richard A .  Epstein ,  In tent ional Harms , 4 J, Leg . Stud .  
39 1 (1 975 ) ; Richard A .  Epstein ,  A Theory o f  Stric t  Liab il ity , 
2 J, Leg . Stud . 1 5 1 ( 1 9 73 ) ;  George Fle tcher , Fairness and Utility in 
To rt Theory , 85 Harv . L. Rev . 537  (1 972 ) .  For a c ri tical discussion 
o f  correct ive j us t ice theories , see Izhak Englard , The System Builders : 
A Critical Appraisal of Modern Amer ican Tort Theory,  9 J .  Leg . Stud . 
2 7, 5 7-68 ( 1 980) , See also Richard A. Posner , Eps tein's Tort Theory : 
A Critique , 8 J. Leg .  Stud . 457  (1 97 9 ) .  
59,  Securi ty could be ef ficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense i f  i t  generated 
cost reduc tions for firms and secured creditors that exceeded the 
(unc ompensa ted) cost increases of the unsecured credi tors . See note 
7 ,  supra . 
60. Professor Kronman has recently argued tha t it sometimes i s  appropriate
to pursue distribut ional concerns in con texts when all par ties bargain
with each o ther . An thony T.  Kronman , Contrac t Law and Distributive
Jus t ice,  89 Yale L.  J, 4 72 ( 1 980) . The area of secured debt and
b ankruptcy p riorities may consti tute such a c ontex t .  In addi tion to
the difficult ies about to be discus sed respect ing such a pursui t ,
however , i t  should be added that any discus sion o f  distributional
issues in bankruptcy is incomple te wi thout a considera t ion of the
Governmen t ' s  tax prio ri ty . See Bankruptcy Ac t § 50 7 (a) (6 ) .  This
priority seriously disadvantages general credi tors . Also , the Pension
Benefi t Guarantee Corporation, a Federal agency , has a l ien superio r to
the claim of unsecured credi tors on the assets of a f i rm that fails
fully to fund certain pension plans . See ERISA, § 4068, 2 9  u. s . c . 
74 
§ 1 368 ( 1 975) . Given the large number of pension plans now in
existence , this lien too c ould harm unsecured c red i t  extenders . 
Discus sion of t he appropria teness of these government priori ties is 
b eyond the scope o f  t his paper . 
See Alan Schwartz,  A Reexamina tion of Nonsubstan tive Unconscionab ility,  
63 Va . L .  Rev . 1053 (1 977) . 
See Schwar t z  and Wilde,  supra note 3 7 ,  
